Burkhard wrote:
> On Sunday, January 21, 2024 at 8:12:46 PM UTC, El Kabong wrote:
>> Burkhard wrote:
>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>> <...>
>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
>>>> wrong.
>>>
>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
>>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
>>>
>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
>>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
>>>
>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the reason
>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just in the
>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
>>>
>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical imperative:
>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen to me,
>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
>>>
>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents, plus the
>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general rule: "do not kill
>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
>>>
>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where members do not
>>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of personal identity
>>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against killing conspecifics.
>>>
>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds, is at least partly
>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may be less likely
>>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that "because we
>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having them enables us
>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more complicated) - just as
>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to scientific theories
>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
>>>
>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical theory, I can
>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually sound, and
>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided as a moral obligation.
>>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is prohibited"
>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered, it needs to be
>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to the other: "Generally,
>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding case to demand or
>>> permit it".
>>>
>>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell me, and flesh this one out.
>>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I can then try to find a
>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the golden rule:
>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights, therefore I too
>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker (for me) intuition
>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible justification for
>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent lives. This then becomes
>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a justification because
>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically implausible. I can then look
>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong, and justify it its need
>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not harm them (or a
>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.: miscarriages happen, it is
>>> applied unevenly, etc)
>>>
>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and constraining empirical facts
>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the intuitions are less clear or
>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes this then leads to
>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) , sometimes to refined or
>>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything is equilibrium. Here an
>>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual balances in detail these
>>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual case, will differ between
>>> societies and cultures
>>>
>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule already. This one for
>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as humans value for our
>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data ethics, though most
>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
>>>
>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and bodily integrity. But we also have
>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship, social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment by others, education,
>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment, and creative and political
>>> expression, among other things"
>>>
>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above process gives me the golden
>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in others would be
>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological element in this: We happen to
>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy member values these
>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But there is also room for society
>>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting values and interests are
>>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise economic security over
>>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these disagreements will
>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree. Often, they can be resolved,
>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both agree it should take
>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
>> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
>> but good read:
>>
>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
>>
>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
>> found.
>>
>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
>>
>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
>> copied to clipboards.>
>>
>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
>
> Well, first I would not buy into that juxtapostion to
> start with, I think the case for the evolutionary roots of religious
> beliefs is quite strong. I might go even further, and argue
> that several hundred thousand years ago, an innate tendency to
> think in terms of deities could well have amplified aspects of the innate
> ability to ethical reasoning in a way that was beneficial in
> evolutionary terms. So e.g. Johnson, D. D. P. & Bering, J. M. (2006)
> Hand of God, mind of man: punishment and cognition in the evolution of cooperation
> Evolutionary Psychology 4: 219–233 In a nutshell, if people believe that
> they are constantly observed by an invisible agent with significant powers of
> punished for transgressions, AND know that others of the tribe belief this too,
> they can more easily trust these other member. This could have faciliated
> e.g. shared childcare.
>
> What you probably mean is that "today", such beliefs are not any longer
> necessary. Though even then, your formulation is problematically
> ambiguous. It seems a clear sociological fact that the details and content of
> the moral beliefs of many people is influenced by their society, and if this
> society has strongly entrenched religious beliefs, these will shape also
> what persons believe. Again, you probably mean something much weaker
> than what you say, that is religious beliefs are not necessary for moral
> beliefs, and that other forces can as well work on the innate basis.
>
If what was said were true, the right and wrong concepts would be true,
historically and universal. I think it's a curious phenomena that belief
in some kind of god(s) is universal, everything from a sun god to an
animal to a mountain to an invisible god. Some have called this a "god
hole" that needs to be filled with _something_ in order to feel complete
and this seems to be almost universally true.
And whatever it is that replaces god in this "god hole", will either be
denied or defended to a huge measure. I suspect that for some Darwinian
evolution is fitted into this god hole which replaces a god.

On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 2:02:47 PM UTC-5, Ron Dean wrote:
> Burkhard wrote:
> > On Sunday, January 21, 2024 at 8:12:46 PM UTC, El Kabong wrote:
> >> Burkhard wrote:
> >>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> >> <...>
> >>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
> >>>> wrong.
> >>>
> >>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
> >>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
> >>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
> >>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
> >>>
> >>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
> >>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
> >>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
> >>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
> >>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
> >>>
> >>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
> >>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
> >>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
> >>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
> >>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the reason
> >>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just in the
> >>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
> >>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
> >>>
> >>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
> >>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
> >>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical imperative:
> >>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen to me,
> >>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
> >>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
> >>>
> >>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
> >>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
> >>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents, plus the
> >>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general rule: "do not kill
> >>> others" or "killing is wrong".
> >>>
> >>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where members do not
> >>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of personal identity
> >>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against killing conspecifics.
> >>>
> >>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds, is at least partly
> >>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may be less likely
> >>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that "because we
> >>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having them enables us
> >>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more complicated) - just as
> >>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to scientific theories
> >>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
> >>>
> >>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical theory, I can
> >>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually sound, and
> >>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided as a moral obligation.
> >>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is prohibited"
> >>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered, it needs to be
> >>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to the other: "Generally,
> >>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding case to demand or
> >>> permit it".
> >>>
> >>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell me, and flesh this one out.
> >>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I can then try to find a
> >>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the golden rule:
> >>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights, therefore I too
> >>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker (for me) intuition
> >>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible justification for
> >>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent lives. This then becomes
> >>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a justification because
> >>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically implausible. I can then look
> >>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong, and justify it its need
> >>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not harm them (or a
> >>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.: miscarriages happen, it is
> >>> applied unevenly, etc)
> >>>
> >>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and constraining empirical facts
> >>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the intuitions are less clear or
> >>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes this then leads to
> >>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) , sometimes to refined or
> >>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything is equilibrium. Here an
> >>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual balances in detail these
> >>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual case, will differ between
> >>> societies and cultures
> >>>
> >>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule already. This one for
> >>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as humans value for our
> >>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data ethics, though most
> >>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
> >>>
> >>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and bodily integrity. But we also have
> >>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship, social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
> >>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment by others, education,
> >>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment, and creative and political
> >>> expression, among other things"
> >>>
> >>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above process gives me the golden
> >>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in others would be
> >>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological element in this: We happen to
> >>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy member values these
> >>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But there is also room for society
> >>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting values and interests are
> >>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise economic security over
> >>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these disagreements will
> >>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree. Often, they can be resolved,
> >>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both agree it should take
> >>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
> >> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
> >> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
> >> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
> >> but good read:
> >>
> >> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
> >>
> >> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
> >> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
> >> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
> >> found.
> >>
> >> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
> >> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
> >> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
> >> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
> >> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
> >> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
> >>
> >> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
> >> copied to clipboards.>
> >>
> >> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
> >> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
> >> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
> >
> > Well, first I would not buy into that juxtapostion to
> > start with, I think the case for the evolutionary roots of religious
> > beliefs is quite strong. I might go even further, and argue
> > that several hundred thousand years ago, an innate tendency to
> > think in terms of deities could well have amplified aspects of the innate
> > ability to ethical reasoning in a way that was beneficial in
> > evolutionary terms. So e.g. Johnson, D. D. P. & Bering, J. M. (2006)
> > Hand of God, mind of man: punishment and cognition in the evolution of cooperation
> > Evolutionary Psychology 4: 219–233 In a nutshell, if people believe that
> > they are constantly observed by an invisible agent with significant powers of
> > punished for transgressions, AND know that others of the tribe belief this too,
> > they can more easily trust these other member. This could have faciliated
> > e.g. shared childcare.
> >
> > What you probably mean is that "today", such beliefs are not any longer
> > necessary. Though even then, your formulation is problematically
> > ambiguous. It seems a clear sociological fact that the details and content of
> > the moral beliefs of many people is influenced by their society, and if this
> > society has strongly entrenched religious beliefs, these will shape also
> > what persons believe. Again, you probably mean something much weaker
> > than what you say, that is religious beliefs are not necessary for moral
> > beliefs, and that other forces can as well work on the innate basis.
> >
> If what was said were true, the right and wrong concepts would be true,
> historically and universal. I think it's a curious phenomena that belief
> in some kind of god(s) is universal, everything from a sun god to an
> animal to a mountain to an invisible god. Some have called this a "god
> hole" that needs to be filled with _something_ in order to feel complete
> and this seems to be almost universally true.
.......
> And whatever it is that replaces god in this "god hole", will either be
> denied or defended to a huge measure. I suspect that for some Darwinian
> evolution is fitted into this god hole which replaces a god.

On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 7:02:47 PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> Burkhard wrote:
> > On Sunday, January 21, 2024 at 8:12:46 PM UTC, El Kabong wrote:
> >> Burkhard wrote:
> >>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> >> <...>
> >>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
> >>>> wrong.
> >>>
> >>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
> >>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
> >>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
> >>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
> >>>
> >>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
> >>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
> >>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
> >>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
> >>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
> >>>
> >>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
> >>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
> >>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
> >>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
> >>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the reason
> >>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just in the
> >>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
> >>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
> >>>
> >>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
> >>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
> >>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical imperative:
> >>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen to me,
> >>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
> >>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
> >>>
> >>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
> >>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
> >>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents, plus the
> >>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general rule: "do not kill
> >>> others" or "killing is wrong".
> >>>
> >>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where members do not
> >>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of personal identity
> >>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against killing conspecifics.
> >>>
> >>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds, is at least partly
> >>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may be less likely
> >>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that "because we
> >>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having them enables us
> >>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more complicated) - just as
> >>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to scientific theories
> >>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
> >>>
> >>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical theory, I can
> >>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually sound, and
> >>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided as a moral obligation.
> >>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is prohibited"
> >>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered, it needs to be
> >>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to the other: "Generally,
> >>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding case to demand or
> >>> permit it".
> >>>
> >>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell me, and flesh this one out.
> >>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I can then try to find a
> >>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the golden rule:
> >>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights, therefore I too
> >>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker (for me) intuition
> >>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible justification for
> >>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent lives. This then becomes
> >>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a justification because
> >>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically implausible. I can then look
> >>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong, and justify it its need
> >>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not harm them (or a
> >>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.: miscarriages happen, it is
> >>> applied unevenly, etc)
> >>>
> >>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and constraining empirical facts
> >>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the intuitions are less clear or
> >>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes this then leads to
> >>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) , sometimes to refined or
> >>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything is equilibrium. Here an
> >>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual balances in detail these
> >>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual case, will differ between
> >>> societies and cultures
> >>>
> >>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule already. This one for
> >>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as humans value for our
> >>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data ethics, though most
> >>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
> >>>
> >>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and bodily integrity. But we also have
> >>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship, social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
> >>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment by others, education,
> >>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment, and creative and political
> >>> expression, among other things"
> >>>
> >>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above process gives me the golden
> >>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in others would be
> >>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological element in this: We happen to
> >>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy member values these
> >>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But there is also room for society
> >>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting values and interests are
> >>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise economic security over
> >>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these disagreements will
> >>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree. Often, they can be resolved,
> >>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both agree it should take
> >>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
> >> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
> >> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
> >> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
> >> but good read:
> >>
> >> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
> >>
> >> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
> >> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
> >> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
> >> found.
> >>
> >> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
> >> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
> >> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
> >> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
> >> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
> >> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
> >>
> >> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
> >> copied to clipboards.>
> >>
> >> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
> >> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
> >> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
> >
> > Well, first I would not buy into that juxtapostion to
> > start with, I think the case for the evolutionary roots of religious
> > beliefs is quite strong. I might go even further, and argue
> > that several hundred thousand years ago, an innate tendency to
> > think in terms of deities could well have amplified aspects of the innate
> > ability to ethical reasoning in a way that was beneficial in
> > evolutionary terms. So e.g. Johnson, D. D. P. & Bering, J. M. (2006)
> > Hand of God, mind of man: punishment and cognition in the evolution of cooperation
> > Evolutionary Psychology 4: 219–233 In a nutshell, if people believe that
> > they are constantly observed by an invisible agent with significant powers of
> > punished for transgressions, AND know that others of the tribe belief this too,
> > they can more easily trust these other member. This could have faciliated
> > e.g. shared childcare.
> >
> > What you probably mean is that "today", such beliefs are not any longer
> > necessary. Though even then, your formulation is problematically
> > ambiguous. It seems a clear sociological fact that the details and content of
> > the moral beliefs of many people is influenced by their society, and if this
> > society has strongly entrenched religious beliefs, these will shape also
> > what persons believe. Again, you probably mean something much weaker
> > than what you say, that is religious beliefs are not necessary for moral
> > beliefs, and that other forces can as well work on the innate basis.
> >
> If what was said were true, the right and wrong concepts would be true,
> historically and universal.

On 1/22/24 10:29 AM, Ron Dean wrote:
> El Kabong wrote:
>> Burkhard wrote:
>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>> <...>
>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
>>>> wrong.
>>>
>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
>>> foundationalim in  any branch of philosophy. but
>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
>>>
>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in  Hosea 13:16,
>>>   I consider  falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
>>>
>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the reason
>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just in
>>> the
>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
>>>
>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical
>>> imperative:
>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen
>>> to me,
>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
>>>
>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents,
>>> plus the
>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general
>>> rule: "do not kill
>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
>>>
>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where members
>>> do not
>>>   fear their own death, maybe because they don't have  a sense of
>>> personal identity
>>> extended in time, are less likely to  come up with  a rule against
>>> killing conspecifics.
>>>
>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds,
>>> is at least partly
>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species  lacking them may
>>> be less likely
>>>   to come up with such a rule. But again, the  argument is not that
>>> "because we
>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong,  rather, having
>>> them enables us
>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full  story is more
>>> complicated) - just as
>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual  spectrum led to
>>> scientific theories
>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
>>>
>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical
>>> theory, I can
>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually
>>> sound, and
>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided
>>> as a moral obligation.
>>> They  also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is
>>> prohibited"
>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered,
>>> it needs to be
>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to
>>> the other: "Generally,
>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding
>>> case to demand or
>>>   permit it".
>>>
>>> At that point  I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell
>>> me,  and flesh this one out.
>>>   A strong intuition e.g. is  killing in self defense is permitted. I
>>> can then try to find a
>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the
>>> golden rule:
>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights,
>>> therefore I too
>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker
>>> (for me) intuition
>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible
>>> justification for
>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent
>>> lives. This then becomes
>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a
>>> justification because
>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically
>>> implausible. I can then look
>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong,
>>> and justify it  its need
>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not
>>> harm them (or a
>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.:
>>> miscarriages happen, it is
>>> applied unevenly, etc)
>>>
>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and
>>> constraining empirical facts
>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the
>>> intuitions are less clear or
>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes this
>>> then leads to
>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) ,
>>> sometimes to refined or
>>> adjusted rules, it is an  always ongoing process to keep everything
>>> is equilibrium. Here an
>>> element of contingent  social factors comes in: how an individual
>>> balances in detail these
>>>   conflicting intuitions,  and how they are applied to the individual
>>> case, will differ  between
>>> societies and cultures
>>>
>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule
>>> already. This one for
>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as
>>> humans value for our
>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data
>>> ethics, though most
>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
>>>
>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and bodily
>>> integrity. But we also have
>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship,
>>> social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment
>>> by others, education,
>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment,
>>> and creative and political
>>> expression, among other things"
>>>
>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above
>>> process gives me the golden
>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in
>>> others would be
>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological
>>> element in this: We happen to
>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy
>>> member values these
>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But there
>>> is also room for society
>>> and contingent historical  factors: how these sometimes conflicting
>>> values and interests are
>>> reconciled will differ between societies  - some will emphasise
>>> economic security over
>>>   autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these
>>> disagreements will
>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree. Often,
>>> they can be resolved,
>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both
>>> agree it should take
>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
>>
>> The following appeared years ago.  I have never been able
>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
>> but good read:
>>
>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
>>
>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
>> found.
>>
>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates.  It is
>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
>>
>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
>> copied to clipboards.>
>>
>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
>>
> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.

On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 1:32:47 PM UTC-5, Ron Dean wrote:
> El Kabong wrote:
> > Burkhard wrote:
> >> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> > <...>
> >>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
> >>> wrong.
> >>
> >> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
> >> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
> >> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
> >> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
> >>
> >> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
> >> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
> >> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
> >> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
> >> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
> >>
> >> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
> >> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
> >> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
> >> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
> >> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the reason
> >> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just in the
> >> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
> >> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
> >>
> >> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
> >> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
> >> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical imperative:
> >> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen to me,
> >> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
> >> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
> >>
> >> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
> >> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
> >> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents, plus the
> >> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general rule: "do not kill
> >> others" or "killing is wrong".
> >>
> >> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where members do not
> >> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of personal identity
> >> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against killing conspecifics.
> >>
> >> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds, is at least partly
> >> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may be less likely
> >> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that "because we
> >> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having them enables us
> >> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more complicated) - just as
> >> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to scientific theories
> >> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
> >>
> >> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical theory, I can
> >> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually sound, and
> >> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided as a moral obligation.
> >> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is prohibited"
> >> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered, it needs to be
> >> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to the other: "Generally,
> >> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding case to demand or
> >> permit it".
> >>
> >> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell me, and flesh this one out.
> >> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I can then try to find a
> >> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the golden rule:
> >> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights, therefore I too
> >> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker (for me) intuition
> >> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible justification for
> >> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent lives. This then becomes
> >> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a justification because
> >> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically implausible. I can then look
> >> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong, and justify it its need
> >> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not harm them (or a
> >> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.: miscarriages happen, it is
> >> applied unevenly, etc)
> >>
> >> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and constraining empirical facts
> >> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the intuitions are less clear or
> >> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes this then leads to
> >> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) , sometimes to refined or
> >> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything is equilibrium. Here an
> >> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual balances in detail these
> >> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual case, will differ between
> >> societies and cultures
> >>
> >> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule already. This one for
> >> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as humans value for our
> >> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data ethics, though most
> >> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
> >>
> >> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and bodily integrity. But we also have
> >> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship, social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
> >> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment by others, education,
> >> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment, and creative and political
> >> expression, among other things"
> >>
> >> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above process gives me the golden
> >> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in others would be
> >> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological element in this: We happen to
> >> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy member values these
> >> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But there is also room for society
> >> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting values and interests are
> >> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise economic security over
> >> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these disagreements will
> >> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree. Often, they can be resolved,
> >> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both agree it should take
> >> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
> >
> > The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
> > to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
> > harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
> > but good read:
> >
> > <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
> >
> > "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
> > known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
> > within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
> > found.
> >
> > "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
> > time identified an area of the human brain that appears
> > unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
> > part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
> > brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
> > of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
> >
> > <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
> > copied to clipboards.>
> >
> > The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
> > part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
> > biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
> >
> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.
.......
>In
> primitive societies the standards were different from what we in the
> judo-christian world accept.

Mark Isaak wrote:
> On 1/22/24 10:29 AM, Ron Dean wrote:
>> El Kabong wrote:
>>> Burkhard wrote:
>>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>>> <...>
>>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
>>>>> wrong.
>>>>
>>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
>>>> foundationalim in  any branch of philosophy. but
>>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
>>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
>>>>
>>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
>>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
>>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
>>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in  Hosea 13:16,
>>>>   I consider  falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
>>>>
>>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
>>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
>>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
>>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
>>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the
>>>> reason
>>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just
>>>> in the
>>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
>>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
>>>>
>>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
>>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
>>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical
>>>> imperative:
>>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen
>>>> to me,
>>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
>>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
>>>>
>>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
>>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
>>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents,
>>>> plus the
>>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general
>>>> rule: "do not kill
>>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
>>>>
>>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where
>>>> members do not
>>>>   fear their own death, maybe because they don't have  a sense of
>>>> personal identity
>>>> extended in time, are less likely to  come up with  a rule against
>>>> killing conspecifics.
>>>>
>>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds,
>>>> is at least partly
>>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species  lacking them may
>>>> be less likely
>>>>   to come up with such a rule. But again, the  argument is not that
>>>> "because we
>>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong,  rather, having
>>>> them enables us
>>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full  story is more
>>>> complicated) - just as
>>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual  spectrum led to
>>>> scientific theories
>>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
>>>>
>>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical
>>>> theory, I can
>>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually
>>>> sound, and
>>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided
>>>> as a moral obligation.
>>>> They  also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is
>>>> prohibited"
>>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered,
>>>> it needs to be
>>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to
>>>> the other: "Generally,
>>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding
>>>> case to demand or
>>>>   permit it".
>>>>
>>>> At that point  I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell
>>>> me,  and flesh this one out.
>>>>   A strong intuition e.g. is  killing in self defense is permitted.
>>>> I can then try to find a
>>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the
>>>> golden rule:
>>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights,
>>>> therefore I too
>>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker
>>>> (for me) intuition
>>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible
>>>> justification for
>>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent
>>>> lives. This then becomes
>>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a
>>>> justification because
>>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically
>>>> implausible. I can then look
>>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong,
>>>> and justify it  its need
>>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not
>>>> harm them (or a
>>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.:
>>>> miscarriages happen, it is
>>>> applied unevenly, etc)
>>>>
>>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and
>>>> constraining empirical facts
>>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the
>>>> intuitions are less clear or
>>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes
>>>> this then leads to
>>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) ,
>>>> sometimes to refined or
>>>> adjusted rules, it is an  always ongoing process to keep everything
>>>> is equilibrium. Here an
>>>> element of contingent  social factors comes in: how an individual
>>>> balances in detail these
>>>>   conflicting intuitions,  and how they are applied to the
>>>> individual case, will differ  between
>>>> societies and cultures
>>>>
>>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule
>>>> already. This one for
>>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as
>>>> humans value for our
>>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data
>>>> ethics, though most
>>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
>>>>
>>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and
>>>> bodily integrity. But we also have
>>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship,
>>>> social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
>>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment
>>>> by others, education,
>>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment,
>>>> and creative and political
>>>> expression, among other things"
>>>>
>>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above
>>>> process gives me the golden
>>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in
>>>> others would be
>>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological
>>>> element in this: We happen to
>>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy
>>>> member values these
>>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But
>>>> there is also room for society
>>>> and contingent historical  factors: how these sometimes conflicting
>>>> values and interests are
>>>> reconciled will differ between societies  - some will emphasise
>>>> economic security over
>>>>   autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these
>>>> disagreements will
>>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree.
>>>> Often, they can be resolved,
>>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both
>>>> agree it should take
>>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
>>>
>>> The following appeared years ago.  I have never been able
>>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
>>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
>>> but good read:
>>>
>>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
>>>
>>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
>>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
>>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
>>> found.
>>>
>>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
>>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
>>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates.  It is
>>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
>>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
>>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
>>>
>>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
>>> copied to clipboards.>
>>>
>>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
>>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
>>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
>>>
>> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
>> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.
>
> So far, I agree with you.
>
>> In primitive societies the standards were different from what we in
>> the judo-christian world accept. In some societies, they saw no wrong
>> in human sacrifices.
>
> How many primitive societies have you participated in?  From my wide
> reading of mythology, it looks to me like moral standards have not
> differed a great deal.  The main differences are that primitive
> societies sanction more retributive justice (likely due to lack of
> institutional justice) and value hospitality higher than modern society.
> (I should note, though, I have made no formal study of such things.)
>
> Regarding human sacrifice, most of that was done to military enemies,
> and if you look at recent history and current events, you see modern
> societies, too, are more than willing to kill even civilians in enemy
> countries.  Other human sacrifice was done at the behest of the gods,
> which does not, I think, advance your argument.
>
I don 't think the fact that human sacrifices were done at the behest of
the gods changes anything
I've read about certain earlier tribes in Latin America that engaged in
human sacrifice. Why do you
that it matters as to the reason for human sacrifice?

broger...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 1:32:47 PM UTC-5, Ron Dean wrote:
>> El Kabong wrote:
>>> Burkhard wrote:
>>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>>> <...>
>>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
>>>>> wrong.
>>>>
>>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
>>>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
>>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
>>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
>>>>
>>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
>>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
>>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
>>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
>>>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
>>>>
>>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
>>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
>>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
>>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
>>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the reason
>>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just in the
>>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
>>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
>>>>
>>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
>>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
>>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical imperative:
>>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen to me,
>>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
>>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
>>>>
>>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
>>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
>>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents, plus the
>>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general rule: "do not kill
>>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
>>>>
>>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where members do not
>>>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of personal identity
>>>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against killing conspecifics.
>>>>
>>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds, is at least partly
>>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may be less likely
>>>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that "because we
>>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having them enables us
>>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more complicated) - just as
>>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to scientific theories
>>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
>>>>
>>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical theory, I can
>>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually sound, and
>>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided as a moral obligation.
>>>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is prohibited"
>>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered, it needs to be
>>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to the other: "Generally,
>>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding case to demand or
>>>> permit it".
>>>>
>>>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell me, and flesh this one out.
>>>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I can then try to find a
>>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the golden rule:
>>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights, therefore I too
>>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker (for me) intuition
>>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible justification for
>>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent lives. This then becomes
>>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a justification because
>>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically implausible. I can then look
>>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong, and justify it its need
>>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not harm them (or a
>>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.: miscarriages happen, it is
>>>> applied unevenly, etc)
>>>>
>>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and constraining empirical facts
>>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the intuitions are less clear or
>>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes this then leads to
>>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) , sometimes to refined or
>>>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything is equilibrium. Here an
>>>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual balances in detail these
>>>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual case, will differ between
>>>> societies and cultures
>>>>
>>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule already. This one for
>>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as humans value for our
>>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data ethics, though most
>>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
>>>>
>>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and bodily integrity. But we also have
>>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship, social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
>>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment by others, education,
>>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment, and creative and political
>>>> expression, among other things"
>>>>
>>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above process gives me the golden
>>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in others would be
>>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological element in this: We happen to
>>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy member values these
>>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But there is also room for society
>>>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting values and interests are
>>>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise economic security over
>>>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these disagreements will
>>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree. Often, they can be resolved,
>>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both agree it should take
>>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
>>>
>>> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
>>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
>>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
>>> but good read:
>>>
>>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
>>>
>>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
>>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
>>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
>>> found.
>>>
>>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
>>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
>>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
>>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
>>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
>>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
>>>
>>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
>>> copied to clipboards.>
>>>
>>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
>>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
>>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
>>>
>> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
>> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.
> ......
>> In
>> primitive societies the standards were different from what we in the
>> judo-christian world accept.
>
> Ah, traditional Judo-Christian values.....Love your enemy, and use his strength against him.
>
That is _your_ interpretation! I'm not surprised.
>
>
>> In some societies, they saw no wrong in
>> human sacrifices.
>

On Thursday, January 25, 2024 at 12:27:50 PM UTC-5, Ron Dean wrote:
> broger...@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 1:32:47 PM UTC-5, Ron Dean wrote:
> >> El Kabong wrote:
> >>> Burkhard wrote:
> >>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> >>> <...>
> >>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
> >>>>> wrong.
> >>>>
> >>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
> >>>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
> >>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
> >>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
> >>>>
> >>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
> >>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
> >>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
> >>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
> >>>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
> >>>>
> >>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
> >>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
> >>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
> >>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
> >>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the reason
> >>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just in the
> >>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
> >>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
> >>>>
> >>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
> >>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
> >>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical imperative:
> >>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen to me,
> >>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
> >>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
> >>>>
> >>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
> >>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
> >>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents, plus the
> >>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general rule: "do not kill
> >>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
> >>>>
> >>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where members do not
> >>>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of personal identity
> >>>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against killing conspecifics.
> >>>>
> >>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds, is at least partly
> >>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may be less likely
> >>>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that "because we
> >>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having them enables us
> >>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more complicated) - just as
> >>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to scientific theories
> >>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
> >>>>
> >>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical theory, I can
> >>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually sound, and
> >>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided as a moral obligation.
> >>>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is prohibited"
> >>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered, it needs to be
> >>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to the other: "Generally,
> >>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding case to demand or
> >>>> permit it".
> >>>>
> >>>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell me, and flesh this one out.
> >>>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I can then try to find a
> >>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the golden rule:
> >>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights, therefore I too
> >>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker (for me) intuition
> >>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible justification for
> >>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent lives. This then becomes
> >>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a justification because
> >>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically implausible. I can then look
> >>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong, and justify it its need
> >>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not harm them (or a
> >>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.: miscarriages happen, it is
> >>>> applied unevenly, etc)
> >>>>
> >>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and constraining empirical facts
> >>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the intuitions are less clear or
> >>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes this then leads to
> >>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) , sometimes to refined or
> >>>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything is equilibrium. Here an
> >>>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual balances in detail these
> >>>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual case, will differ between
> >>>> societies and cultures
> >>>>
> >>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule already. This one for
> >>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as humans value for our
> >>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data ethics, though most
> >>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
> >>>>
> >>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and bodily integrity. But we also have
> >>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship, social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
> >>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment by others, education,
> >>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment, and creative and political
> >>>> expression, among other things"
> >>>>
> >>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above process gives me the golden
> >>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in others would be
> >>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological element in this: We happen to
> >>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy member values these
> >>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But there is also room for society
> >>>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting values and interests are
> >>>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise economic security over
> >>>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these disagreements will
> >>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree. Often, they can be resolved,
> >>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both agree it should take
> >>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
> >>>
> >>> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
> >>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
> >>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
> >>> but good read:
> >>>
> >>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
> >>>
> >>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
> >>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
> >>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
> >>> found.
> >>>
> >>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
> >>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
> >>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
> >>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
> >>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
> >>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
> >>>
> >>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
> >>> copied to clipboards.>
> >>>
> >>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
> >>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
> >>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
> >>>
> >> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
> >> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.
> > ......
> >> In
> >> primitive societies the standards were different from what we in the
> >> judo-christian world accept.
.....
> > Ah, traditional Judo-Christian values.....Love your enemy, and use his strength against him.
> >
> That is _your_ interpretation! I'm not surprised.

On 25/01/2024 17:25, Ron Dean wrote:
> broger...@gmail.com wrote:
>> On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 1:32:47 PM UTC-5, Ron Dean wrote:
>>> El Kabong wrote:
>>>> Burkhard wrote:
>>>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>>>> <...>
>>>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
>>>>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
>>>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
>>>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
>>>>>
>>>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
>>>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
>>>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
>>>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
>>>>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
>>>>>
>>>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
>>>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
>>>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
>>>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
>>>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the
>>>>> reason
>>>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just
>>>>> in the
>>>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
>>>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
>>>>>
>>>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
>>>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
>>>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical
>>>>> imperative:
>>>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to
>>>>> happen to me,
>>>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
>>>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
>>>>>
>>>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
>>>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to
>>>>> them. So
>>>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my
>>>>> parents, plus the
>>>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general
>>>>> rule: "do not kill
>>>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
>>>>>
>>>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where
>>>>> members do not
>>>>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of
>>>>> personal identity
>>>>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against
>>>>> killing conspecifics.
>>>>>
>>>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds,
>>>>> is at least partly
>>>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may
>>>>> be less likely
>>>>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that
>>>>> "because we
>>>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having
>>>>> them enables us
>>>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more
>>>>> complicated) - just as
>>>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to
>>>>> scientific theories
>>>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
>>>>>
>>>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical
>>>>> theory, I can
>>>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually
>>>>> sound, and
>>>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided
>>>>> as a moral obligation.
>>>>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is
>>>>> prohibited"
>>>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is
>>>>> encountered, it needs to be
>>>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to
>>>>> the other: "Generally,
>>>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding
>>>>> case to demand or
>>>>> permit it".
>>>>>
>>>>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell
>>>>> me, and flesh this one out.
>>>>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I
>>>>> can then try to find a
>>>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the
>>>>> golden rule:
>>>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights,
>>>>> therefore I too
>>>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker
>>>>> (for me) intuition
>>>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible
>>>>> justification for
>>>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent
>>>>> lives. This then becomes
>>>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as
>>>>> a justification because
>>>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically
>>>>> implausible. I can then look
>>>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong,
>>>>> and justify it its need
>>>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not
>>>>> harm them (or a
>>>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.:
>>>>> miscarriages happen, it is
>>>>> applied unevenly, etc)
>>>>>
>>>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules
>>>>> and constraining empirical facts
>>>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the
>>>>> intuitions are less clear or
>>>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes
>>>>> this then leads to
>>>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) ,
>>>>> sometimes to refined or
>>>>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything
>>>>> is equilibrium. Here an
>>>>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual
>>>>> balances in detail these
>>>>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual
>>>>> case, will differ between
>>>>> societies and cultures
>>>>>
>>>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule
>>>>> already. This one for
>>>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as
>>>>> humans value for our
>>>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data
>>>>> ethics, though most
>>>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
>>>>>
>>>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and
>>>>> bodily integrity. But we also have
>>>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship,
>>>>> social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
>>>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair
>>>>> treatment by others, education,
>>>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play,
>>>>> entertainment, and creative and political
>>>>> expression, among other things"
>>>>>
>>>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above
>>>>> process gives me the golden
>>>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in
>>>>> others would be
>>>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological
>>>>> element in this: We happen to
>>>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy
>>>>> member values these
>>>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But
>>>>> there is also room for society
>>>>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting
>>>>> values and interests are
>>>>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise
>>>>> economic security over
>>>>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these
>>>>> disagreements will
>>>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree.
>>>>> Often, they can be resolved,
>>>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both
>>>>> agree it should take
>>>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
>>>>
>>>> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
>>>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
>>>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
>>>> but good read:
>>>>
>>>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
>>>>
>>>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
>>>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
>>>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
>>>> found.
>>>>
>>>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
>>>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
>>>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
>>>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
>>>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
>>>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
>>>>
>>>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
>>>> copied to clipboards.>
>>>>
>>>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
>>>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
>>>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
>>>>
>>> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
>>> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.
>> ......
>>> In
>>> primitive societies the standards were different from what we in the
>>> judo-christian world accept.
>>
>> Ah, traditional Judo-Christian values.....Love your enemy, and use his
>> strength against him.
>>
> That is _your_ interpretation! I'm not surprised.

On Thursday, January 25, 2024 at 5:22:50 PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> Mark Isaak wrote:
> > On 1/22/24 10:29 AM, Ron Dean wrote:
> >> El Kabong wrote:
> >>> Burkhard wrote:
> >>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> >>> <...>
> >>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of right and
> >>>>> wrong.
> >>>>
> >>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
> >>>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
> >>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
> >>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
> >>>>
> >>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
> >>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
> >>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
> >>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
> >>>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
> >>>>
> >>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
> >>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
> >>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
> >>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
> >>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the
> >>>> reason
> >>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just
> >>>> in the
> >>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
> >>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
> >>>>
> >>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
> >>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
> >>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical
> >>>> imperative:
> >>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to happen
> >>>> to me,
> >>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I feel
> >>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
> >>>>
> >>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
> >>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to them. So
> >>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my parents,
> >>>> plus the
> >>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general
> >>>> rule: "do not kill
> >>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
> >>>>
> >>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where
> >>>> members do not
> >>>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of
> >>>> personal identity
> >>>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against
> >>>> killing conspecifics.
> >>>>
> >>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other minds,
> >>>> is at least partly
> >>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them may
> >>>> be less likely
> >>>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that
> >>>> "because we
> >>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having
> >>>> them enables us
> >>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more
> >>>> complicated) - just as
> >>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to
> >>>> scientific theories
> >>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
> >>>>
> >>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical
> >>>> theory, I can
> >>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be factually
> >>>> sound, and
> >>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly unaided
> >>>> as a moral obligation.
> >>>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is
> >>>> prohibited"
> >>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is encountered,
> >>>> it needs to be
> >>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to
> >>>> the other: "Generally,
> >>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding
> >>>> case to demand or
> >>>> permit it".
> >>>>
> >>>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell
> >>>> me, and flesh this one out.
> >>>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted.
> >>>> I can then try to find a
> >>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the
> >>>> golden rule:
> >>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights,
> >>>> therefore I too
> >>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker
> >>>> (for me) intuition
> >>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible
> >>>> justification for
> >>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent
> >>>> lives. This then becomes
> >>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as a
> >>>> justification because
> >>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically
> >>>> implausible. I can then look
> >>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is wrong,
> >>>> and justify it its need
> >>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not
> >>>> harm them (or a
> >>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.:
> >>>> miscarriages happen, it is
> >>>> applied unevenly, etc)
> >>>>
> >>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules and
> >>>> constraining empirical facts
> >>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the
> >>>> intuitions are less clear or
> >>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes
> >>>> this then leads to
> >>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound) ,
> >>>> sometimes to refined or
> >>>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything
> >>>> is equilibrium. Here an
> >>>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual
> >>>> balances in detail these
> >>>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the
> >>>> individual case, will differ between
> >>>> societies and cultures
> >>>>
> >>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule
> >>>> already. This one for
> >>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as
> >>>> humans value for our
> >>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data
> >>>> ethics, though most
> >>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
> >>>>
> >>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and
> >>>> bodily integrity. But we also have
> >>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family, friendship,
> >>>> social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
> >>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair treatment
> >>>> by others, education,
> >>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play, entertainment,
> >>>> and creative and political
> >>>> expression, among other things"
> >>>>
> >>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above
> >>>> process gives me the golden
> >>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in
> >>>> others would be
> >>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological
> >>>> element in this: We happen to
> >>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy
> >>>> member values these
> >>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But
> >>>> there is also room for society
> >>>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting
> >>>> values and interests are
> >>>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise
> >>>> economic security over
> >>>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these
> >>>> disagreements will
> >>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree.
> >>>> Often, they can be resolved,
> >>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both
> >>>> agree it should take
> >>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
> >>>
> >>> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
> >>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
> >>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
> >>> but good read:
> >>>
> >>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
> >>>
> >>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
> >>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
> >>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
> >>> found.
> >>>
> >>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
> >>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
> >>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
> >>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
> >>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
> >>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
> >>>
> >>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
> >>> copied to clipboards.>
> >>>
> >>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
> >>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
> >>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
> >>>
> >> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
> >> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.
> >
> > So far, I agree with you.
> >
> >> In primitive societies the standards were different from what we in
> >> the judo-christian world accept. In some societies, they saw no wrong
> >> in human sacrifices.
> >
> > How many primitive societies have you participated in? From my wide
> > reading of mythology, it looks to me like moral standards have not
> > differed a great deal. The main differences are that primitive
> > societies sanction more retributive justice (likely due to lack of
> > institutional justice) and value hospitality higher than modern society..
> > (I should note, though, I have made no formal study of such things.)
> >
> > Regarding human sacrifice, most of that was done to military enemies,
> > and if you look at recent history and current events, you see modern
> > societies, too, are more than willing to kill even civilians in enemy
> > countries. Other human sacrifice was done at the behest of the gods,
> > which does not, I think, advance your argument.
> >
> I don 't think the fact that human sacrifices were done at the behest of
> the gods changes anything
> I've read about certain earlier tribes in Latin America that engaged in
> human sacrifice. Why do you
> that it matters as to the reason for human sacrifice?

Burkhard wrote:
> On Monday, January 15, 2024 at 9:37:40 PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>> broger...@gmail.com wrote:
(snip)

>>>>>>>> If you understood why murder is morally wrong, you would not ask]the question,
>>>>>>>> or wonder why atheists and theist typically agree that (many forms of)
>>>>>>>> murder are wrong.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ISTM B.Rogers hit it on the nose elsethread:
>>>>>>> ***********************************
>>>>>>> You seem to think that admitting we are animals means that there's no
>>>>>>> reason to behave morally. That's nonsense. You seem to share with a
>>>>>>> number of evangelicals I have known the idea that if we are not the
>>>>>>> special creation of a personal God, the purpose for which the universe
>>>>>>> was created, then life had no meaning and there's no morality. That's
>>>>>>> your own failure of imagination, not a consequence of the theory of
>>>>>>> evolution.
>>>>>>> **********************************
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> In history and perhaps even today, tribes of people who kill and eat
>>>>>> other people. How do we apply our morality to people who practice
>>>>>> cannibalism. Is this immoral; if so why? After all, we are nothing more
>>>>>> than animals that evolved along with and from other animals. Do you
>>>>>> think that people involved in cannibalism had any moral concerns, more
>>>>>> so than than animals.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://duckduckgo.com/?q=people+who+eat+people+facts&va=b&t=hr&ia=web
>>>>>
we are nothing more than evolved animals, so can you
>>>> condemn cannibals on their practice of killing and eating humans? No,
>>>> you cannot! You have _NO_ moral grounds to do so!
>>>
>>>
>>> Of course I can condemn cannibalism. I say that all people should be treated as we would treat our own group. Killing people and eating them is not how we would treat our friends and family. It's wrong.
>>>
>> But you do _not_ say why it's wrong if it were to serve _our purpose.
>> This is your opinion, but do you have the right to force your opinion on
>> people who practice cannibalism? If you think so. on what moral grounds?
>> It nothing more than your opinion, which you are entitled to as it
>> applies to you and your life. But there is _no_ moral basis for it.
>>>
>>> I'll remind you that many groups who actually practiced human sacrifice and cannibalism on a large scale did so without the benefit of the theory of evolution and did it on the basis of religious justification.
>>>
>> Paganism! Not all religions are the same. I personally think deistism is
>> the _ only_ rational position to have. For the simple we _cannot_ CAN
>> NOT know.
>>>
>>> In any case, I am perfectly free to condemn cannibalism, whether or not you think I have a proper justification for doing so.
>>>
>> OK, but this is not so much about you think, since your thoughts have
>> absolutely _no_ bearing upon what people who practice cannibalism think
>> and practice, So it's pointless. You have no moral justification to
>> impose your opinion on such people. IOW you cannot claim they have no
>> right to engage in this practice. So, in reality, you have nothing to
>> say about it.
>>
>> And this has caused me some personal discomforts, I see myself in the
>> much same light because of what I know and what I think I know.
>
> My guess is that you endorse things that some religions consider
> cannibalism. Members of these religions also think that their religion
> gives them the moral right to force you to abide by their rules.
> Do you think the fact that they are theists entitles them to that position?
>
Of course not! I stand in opposition to organized religion, so why would
I think any religion has the right to force anyone to do anything? But,
I'm convinced that religion, unfortunately, does take control over
peoples lives, and religion accomplishes this by their proclaimed
_authority_. A person or the leaders claims to have been given the
_sole_ and the exclusive right by God to represent him on Planet Earth.
They send out missionaries who use this bully pulpit to create doubt
even distress in other church members which they term "non-believer". I
entertained three "missionaries" who
out of the blue, came knocking on my front door a few months ago. I knew
something about this sect, but I wanted to hear their message, It did
not go well and after two different times they left.

You may be baptized, taken the sacraments in your religion. But the
"missionaries" will insist your baptism and sacraments were unrecognized
by God because they were not performed by an authorized representative
of God. Certain religions use this idea or authority, as a threat that's
above people's head like Damascus's sword, that's held by a thread.
People who become convinced by these missionaries are the re-baptized
and accept the power and authority of the church leaders, to have
control over their minds, their thoughts, their lives and their futures.

They force people who accept this claim of "authority" into submission
or obedience to them, IE their laws and their rituals and obedience to
these authorities as God's representatives. I think this applies mainly
to religions with a figure head at the top.

I think back to the time I heard the Christian message. There was
nothing about authority. According to what I had learned, was that Jesus
Christ was crucified, suffered and died on the cross strictly for our
benefit - that is for the forgiveness of our sins. And sin alone is
sufficient to remove one from the presence of God forever. In order to
be saved, it took nothing more than belief or faith in Christ and his
sacrifice for ones salvation. And "authority" is totally unnecessary.
In my opinion, religious authority is nothing more than a power grab!

Personally, I completely abandoned Christianity during my younger days.
I became a doubter, a questioner, but I did have very serious doubts,
maybe I became agnostic, but I was never a full blown atheist, There are
things that's happened in my life that causes me to re-think my
position. To some degree TO has been instrumental in my considerations.
There are too many things that I've learned that are not rationally
answered, yet they are real. I have no faith that a natural cause or
explanation will ever happen.
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Do you think swapping ToE with ID/Creationism would make people
>>>>> more moral? Specifically, do you think people would stop eating other
>>>>> people if they accepted ID/Creationism? Would it be enough for you if
>>>>> they just felt really, really bad about doing it?
>>>>>
>>>> Whether they would or not, it has nothing to do with the issue I
>>>> mentioned. It's just an attempt at escape. In fact since we are just
>>>> animals ToE tends to undermine morality. From an evolutionary basis
>>>> there is _NO_ grounds for one animal killing and eating another
>>>> morality. It happens in the
>>>> natural world and we are animals in the natural world. If evolution is
>>>> reality there's nothing special about us animals.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If
>>>>>>>>>>> someone decides to rob store, it's to his advantage not to leave
>>>>>>>>>>> witnesses, "Survival" comes into play, why is morally wrong for him to
>>>>>>>>>>> not leave witnesses to testify against him in a court of law?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You emphasized _common_ moral ground. There are differences in how people regard specific moral issues, abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, how far a duty to help others extends, etc. But religious people do not agree about these things among themselves, so there's no more _commonality_ among the religious than there is among atheists. Morality does not come from religion, even for religious people, it comes from our natural moral sentiments. If you need the Bible to tell you that murder is wrong, there's something wrong with you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or do a search on any post where I reminded you to be mindful of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> legacy on this Earth. Or are you going to blame these comments of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yours on your doppelganger?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To know less than we don't know is the nature of most knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> To know less than we don't know is the nature of most knowledge
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> To know less than we don't know is the nature of most knowledge
>>>>>
>>>
>

On Thu, 25 Jan 2024 19:03:36 -0500, Ron Dean
<rondean-noreply@gmail.com> wrote:

>Burkhard wrote:
>> On Monday, January 15, 2024 at 9:37:40?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>>> broger...@gmail.com wrote:
>(snip)
>
>>>>>>>>> If you understood why murder is morally wrong, you would not ask]the question,
>>>>>>>>> or wonder why atheists and theist typically agree that (many forms of)
>>>>>>>>> murder are wrong.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ISTM B.Rogers hit it on the nose elsethread:
>>>>>>>> ***********************************
>>>>>>>> You seem to think that admitting we are animals means that there's no
>>>>>>>> reason to behave morally. That's nonsense. You seem to share with a
>>>>>>>> number of evangelicals I have known the idea that if we are not the
>>>>>>>> special creation of a personal God, the purpose for which the universe
>>>>>>>> was created, then life had no meaning and there's no morality. That's
>>>>>>>> your own failure of imagination, not a consequence of the theory of
>>>>>>>> evolution.
>>>>>>>> **********************************
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In history and perhaps even today, tribes of people who kill and eat
>>>>>>> other people. How do we apply our morality to people who practice
>>>>>>> cannibalism. Is this immoral; if so why? After all, we are nothing more
>>>>>>> than animals that evolved along with and from other animals. Do you
>>>>>>> think that people involved in cannibalism had any moral concerns, more
>>>>>>> so than than animals.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://duckduckgo.com/?q=people+who+eat+people+facts&va=b&t=hr&ia=web
>>>>>>
> we are nothing more than evolved animals, so can you
>>>>> condemn cannibals on their practice of killing and eating humans? No,
>>>>> you cannot! You have _NO_ moral grounds to do so!
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course I can condemn cannibalism. I say that all people should be treated as we would treat our own group. Killing people and eating them is not how we would treat our friends and family. It's wrong.
>>>>
>>> But you do _not_ say why it's wrong if it were to serve _our purpose.
>>> This is your opinion, but do you have the right to force your opinion on
>>> people who practice cannibalism? If you think so. on what moral grounds?
>>> It nothing more than your opinion, which you are entitled to as it
>>> applies to you and your life. But there is _no_ moral basis for it.
>>>>
>>>> I'll remind you that many groups who actually practiced human sacrifice and cannibalism on a large scale did so without the benefit of the theory of evolution and did it on the basis of religious justification.
>>>>
>>> Paganism! Not all religions are the same. I personally think deistism is
>>> the _ only_ rational position to have. For the simple we _cannot_ CAN
>>> NOT know.
>>>>
>>>> In any case, I am perfectly free to condemn cannibalism, whether or not you think I have a proper justification for doing so.
>>>>
>>> OK, but this is not so much about you think, since your thoughts have
>>> absolutely _no_ bearing upon what people who practice cannibalism think
>>> and practice, So it's pointless. You have no moral justification to
>>> impose your opinion on such people. IOW you cannot claim they have no
>>> right to engage in this practice. So, in reality, you have nothing to
>>> say about it.
>>>
>>> And this has caused me some personal discomforts, I see myself in the
>>> much same light because of what I know and what I think I know.
>>
>> My guess is that you endorse things that some religions consider
>> cannibalism. Members of these religions also think that their religion
>> gives them the moral right to force you to abide by their rules.
>> Do you think the fact that they are theists entitles them to that position?
> >
>Of course not! I stand in opposition to organized religion, so why would
>I think any religion has the right to force anyone to do anything? But,
>I'm convinced that religion, unfortunately, does take control over
>peoples lives, and religion accomplishes this by their proclaimed
>_authority_. A person or the leaders claims to have been given the
>_sole_ and the exclusive right by God to represent him on Planet Earth.
>They send out missionaries who use this bully pulpit to create doubt
>even distress in other church members which they term "non-believer". I
>entertained three "missionaries" who
>out of the blue, came knocking on my front door a few months ago. I knew
>something about this sect, but I wanted to hear their message, It did
>not go well and after two different times they left.
>
>You may be baptized, taken the sacraments in your religion. But the
>"missionaries" will insist your baptism and sacraments were unrecognized
>by God because they were not performed by an authorized representative
>of God. Certain religions use this idea or authority, as a threat that's
>above people's head like Damascus's sword, that's held by a thread.
>People who become convinced by these missionaries are the re-baptized
>and accept the power and authority of the church leaders, to have
>control over their minds, their thoughts, their lives and their futures.
>
>They force people who accept this claim of "authority" into submission
>or obedience to them, IE their laws and their rituals and obedience to
>these authorities as God's representatives. I think this applies mainly
>to religions with a figure head at the top.
>
>I think back to the time I heard the Christian message. There was
>nothing about authority. According to what I had learned, was that Jesus
>Christ was crucified, suffered and died on the cross strictly for our
>benefit - that is for the forgiveness of our sins. And sin alone is
>sufficient to remove one from the presence of God forever. In order to
>be saved, it took nothing more than belief or faith in Christ and his
>sacrifice for ones salvation. And "authority" is totally unnecessary.
>In my opinion, religious authority is nothing more than a power grab!
>
>Personally, I completely abandoned Christianity during my younger days.
>I became a doubter, a questioner, but I did have very serious doubts,
>maybe I became agnostic, but I was never a full blown atheist, There are
>things that's happened in my life that causes me to re-think my
>position. To some degree TO has been instrumental in my considerations.
>There are too many things that I've learned that are not rationally
>answered, yet they are real. I have no faith that a natural cause or
>explanation will ever happen.

IIUC the above, your testimony is you're a congregation of one. What
remains unclear is what that has to do with your expressed claim that
accepting evolution leads to immoral behavior. What your testimony
shows is you're as willing to cherrypick which religious nonsense to
reject as you are to cherrypick which documented scientific evidence
to deny.

Your argument is a false equivalence. Scientific explanations are not
based on faith, but on evidence and reason. That you recognize and
reject some of the more obvious irrationalities of some organized
religions, does not justify your promotion of their other
irrationalities, which include not just your expressed claim in this
thread, but also a host of other Creationist PRATTs you have promoted
over the years.

>>>>>> 2. Do you think swapping ToE with ID/Creationism would make people
>>>>>> more moral? Specifically, do you think people would stop eating other
>>>>>> people if they accepted ID/Creationism? Would it be enough for you if
>>>>>> they just felt really, really bad about doing it?
>>>>>>
>>>>> Whether they would or not, it has nothing to do with the issue I
>>>>> mentioned. It's just an attempt at escape. In fact since we are just
>>>>> animals ToE tends to undermine morality. From an evolutionary basis
>>>>> there is _NO_ grounds for one animal killing and eating another
>>>>> morality. It happens in the
>>>>> natural world and we are animals in the natural world. If evolution is
>>>>> reality there's nothing special about us animals.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If
>>>>>>>>>>>> someone decides to rob store, it's to his advantage not to leave
>>>>>>>>>>>> witnesses, "Survival" comes into play, why is morally wrong for him to
>>>>>>>>>>>> not leave witnesses to testify against him in a court of law?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You emphasized _common_ moral ground. There are differences in how people regard specific moral issues, abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, how far a duty to help others extends, etc. But religious people do not agree about these things among themselves, so there's no more _commonality_ among the religious than there is among atheists. Morality does not come from religion, even for religious people, it comes from our natural moral sentiments. If you need the Bible to tell you that murder is wrong, there's something wrong with you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Or do a search on any post where I reminded you to be mindful of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> legacy on this Earth. Or are you going to blame these comments of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yours on your doppelganger?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To know less than we don't know is the nature of most knowledge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> To know less than we don't know is the nature of most knowledge
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> To know less than we don't know is the nature of most knowledge
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>

On Friday 26 January 2024 at 02:07:50 UTC+2, Ron Dean wrote:
> Burkhard wrote:
> > On Monday, January 15, 2024 at 9:37:40 PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
> >> broger...@gmail.com wrote:
> (snip)
>
> >>>>>>>> If you understood why murder is morally wrong, you would not ask]the question,
> >>>>>>>> or wonder why atheists and theist typically agree that (many forms of)
> >>>>>>>> murder are wrong.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> ISTM B.Rogers hit it on the nose elsethread:
> >>>>>>> ***********************************
> >>>>>>> You seem to think that admitting we are animals means that there's no
> >>>>>>> reason to behave morally. That's nonsense. You seem to share with a
> >>>>>>> number of evangelicals I have known the idea that if we are not the
> >>>>>>> special creation of a personal God, the purpose for which the universe
> >>>>>>> was created, then life had no meaning and there's no morality. That's
> >>>>>>> your own failure of imagination, not a consequence of the theory of
> >>>>>>> evolution.
> >>>>>>> **********************************
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>> In history and perhaps even today, tribes of people who kill and eat
> >>>>>> other people. How do we apply our morality to people who practice
> >>>>>> cannibalism. Is this immoral; if so why? After all, we are nothing more
> >>>>>> than animals that evolved along with and from other animals. Do you
> >>>>>> think that people involved in cannibalism had any moral concerns, more
> >>>>>> so than than animals.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> https://duckduckgo.com/?q=people+who+eat+people+facts&va=b&t=hr&ia=web
> >>>>>
> we are nothing more than evolved animals, so can you
> >>>> condemn cannibals on their practice of killing and eating humans? No,
> >>>> you cannot! You have _NO_ moral grounds to do so!
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Of course I can condemn cannibalism. I say that all people should be treated as we would treat our own group. Killing people and eating them is not how we would treat our friends and family. It's wrong.
> >>>
> >> But you do _not_ say why it's wrong if it were to serve _our purpose.
> >> This is your opinion, but do you have the right to force your opinion on
> >> people who practice cannibalism? If you think so. on what moral grounds?
> >> It nothing more than your opinion, which you are entitled to as it
> >> applies to you and your life. But there is _no_ moral basis for it.
> >>>
> >>> I'll remind you that many groups who actually practiced human sacrifice and cannibalism on a large scale did so without the benefit of the theory of evolution and did it on the basis of religious justification.
> >>>
> >> Paganism! Not all religions are the same. I personally think deistism is
> >> the _ only_ rational position to have. For the simple we _cannot_ CAN
> >> NOT know.
> >>>
> >>> In any case, I am perfectly free to condemn cannibalism, whether or not you think I have a proper justification for doing so.
> >>>
> >> OK, but this is not so much about you think, since your thoughts have
> >> absolutely _no_ bearing upon what people who practice cannibalism think
> >> and practice, So it's pointless. You have no moral justification to
> >> impose your opinion on such people. IOW you cannot claim they have no
> >> right to engage in this practice. So, in reality, you have nothing to
> >> say about it.
> >>
> >> And this has caused me some personal discomforts, I see myself in the
> >> much same light because of what I know and what I think I know.
> >
> > My guess is that you endorse things that some religions consider
> > cannibalism. Members of these religions also think that their religion
> > gives them the moral right to force you to abide by their rules.
> > Do you think the fact that they are theists entitles them to that position?
> >
> Of course not! I stand in opposition to organized religion, so why would
> I think any religion has the right to force anyone to do anything? But,
> I'm convinced that religion, unfortunately, does take control over
> peoples lives, and religion accomplishes this by their proclaimed
> _authority_. A person or the leaders claims to have been given the
> _sole_ and the exclusive right by God to represent him on Planet Earth.
> They send out missionaries who use this bully pulpit to create doubt
> even distress in other church members which they term "non-believer". I
> entertained three "missionaries" who
> out of the blue, came knocking on my front door a few months ago. I knew
> something about this sect, but I wanted to hear their message, It did
> not go well and after two different times they left.
>
> You may be baptized, taken the sacraments in your religion. But the
> "missionaries" will insist your baptism and sacraments were unrecognized
> by God because they were not performed by an authorized representative
> of God. Certain religions use this idea or authority, as a threat that's
> above people's head like Damascus's sword, that's held by a thread.
> People who become convinced by these missionaries are the re-baptized
> and accept the power and authority of the church leaders, to have
> control over their minds, their thoughts, their lives and their futures.
>
> They force people who accept this claim of "authority" into submission
> or obedience to them, IE their laws and their rituals and obedience to
> these authorities as God's representatives. I think this applies mainly
> to religions with a figure head at the top.
>
> I think back to the time I heard the Christian message. There was
> nothing about authority. According to what I had learned, was that Jesus
> Christ was crucified, suffered and died on the cross strictly for our
> benefit - that is for the forgiveness of our sins. And sin alone is
> sufficient to remove one from the presence of God forever. In order to
> be saved, it took nothing more than belief or faith in Christ and his
> sacrifice for ones salvation. And "authority" is totally unnecessary.
> In my opinion, religious authority is nothing more than a power grab!
>
> Personally, I completely abandoned Christianity during my younger days.
> I became a doubter, a questioner, but I did have very serious doubts,
> maybe I became agnostic, but I was never a full blown atheist, There are
> things that's happened in my life that causes me to re-think my
> position. To some degree TO has been instrumental in my considerations.
> There are too many things that I've learned that are not rationally
> answered, yet they are real. I have no faith that a natural cause or
> explanation will ever happen.
>
Science does not try to suggest what you should do or avoid doing,
who you should believe or how you should behave. It does not claim
that theism is wrong or that God does not exist. It only collects and
systematises facts about our world and tries to find out working
relations between those facts. Science does not answer where it
does not have answers. Lack of answer is normal and default
situation for science.

Anti-theistic world-views and philosophies compete with theism.
These give you answer. "God is nonsense. Folklore. There are no
such thing. Only idiots think that someone watches very closely
what you do, never communicates with you but after you die
punishes you." That is philosophical-political answer, not
scientific.

So your three mistakes:
1) You want to argue with anti-theistic philosphies using that
science denial garbage. Most of them do not care about
biology. Their position is that your God is full idiocy. And
that YOU have no science that shows that it is not.
2) You accuse science not giving you detailed answers to every
question. Science is not meant to.
3) You avoid studying answers given to you. It is not fault of
science that the books are too thick, articles too complex and
your time too short.

Ernest Major wrote:
> On 25/01/2024 17:25, Ron Dean wrote:
>> broger...@gmail.com wrote:
>>> On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 1:32:47 PM UTC-5, Ron Dean wrote:
>>>> El Kabong wrote:
>>>>> Burkhard wrote:
>>>>>> On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:17:45?PM UTC, Ron Dean wrote:
>>>>> <...>
>>>>>>> Okay, what is your basis for morality? That is your sense of
>>>>>>> right and
>>>>>>> wrong.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Don't know if i have a "basis", never been a great fan of
>>>>>> foundationalim in any branch of philosophy. but
>>>>>> as a general approach, what Rawls described as"reflexive
>>>>>> equilibrium" is I think a good model:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I start with some basic and deeply held intuitions as raw data
>>>>>> I don't need a god, book, or theory to tell me that killing babies is
>>>>>> wrong, e.g., and conversely, any purported ethical system
>>>>>> that demands killing babies from me, as e.g. in Hosea 13:16,
>>>>>> I consider falsified by this discrepancy between intuition and rule.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Undoubtedly, some of these basic intuitions I have as the result
>>>>>> of my formative years, and are influenced by parents and society,
>>>>>> but as an empirical fact, I notice that they are pretty much constant
>>>>>> across times and societies. Note, I'm not saying that "having been
>>>>>> accepted at (almost) all societies at (almost ) all times" is the
>>>>>> reason
>>>>>> why they are normatively valid, rather, it is a sanity check. Just
>>>>>> in the
>>>>>> same way that it is reassuring that not only me, but everyone who
>>>>>> was there saw the elephant on Princess Street.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I then infer from these individual intuitions some general rules that
>>>>>> systematise them. A very important rule, probably the most important
>>>>>> one, is what has been called the golden rule, or the categorical
>>>>>> imperative:
>>>>>> I recognise that there are things that I really don't want to
>>>>>> happen to me,
>>>>>> I strongly wish that nobody inflicts them on me, and if they do I
>>>>>> feel
>>>>>> wronged. I don't want to get killed, e.g..
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am also able to recognise others as essentially the same as
>>>>>> me, and therefore likely sharing that feeling when it comes to
>>>>>> them. So
>>>>>> from the strong intuition that it would be wrong to kill my
>>>>>> parents, plus the
>>>>>> recognition that I too don't want to get killed, I infer a general
>>>>>> rule: "do not kill
>>>>>> others" or "killing is wrong".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Some of this reasoning is enabled by biology: a species where
>>>>>> members do not
>>>>>> fear their own death, maybe because they don't have a sense of
>>>>>> personal identity
>>>>>> extended in time, are less likely to come up with a rule against
>>>>>> killing conspecifics.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Similarly, the ability for empathy, the recognition of other
>>>>>> minds, is at least partly
>>>>>> caused by mirror neurons in our brain, and species lacking them
>>>>>> may be less likely
>>>>>> to come up with such a rule. But again, the argument is not that
>>>>>> "because we
>>>>>> have mirror neurons etc", killing others is wrong, rather, having
>>>>>> them enables us
>>>>>> to recognise the wrongness (though the full story is more
>>>>>> complicated) - just as
>>>>>> having evolved eyes that perceive in the visual spectrum led to
>>>>>> scientific theories
>>>>>> describing the behaviour of visible objects first.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Once I have a set of similar generalisations, a nascent ethical
>>>>>> theory, I can
>>>>>> carry out some soundness checks. The rules should e.g. be
>>>>>> factually sound, and
>>>>>> not demand the impossible, e.g. not demand of humans to fly
>>>>>> unaided as a moral obligation.
>>>>>> They also should be consistent, and not e.g. have both "killing is
>>>>>> prohibited"
>>>>>> and "killing is mandatory". If such an inconsistency is
>>>>>> encountered, it needs to be
>>>>>> resolved. One possibility e.g. is to treat one as the exception to
>>>>>> the other: "Generally,
>>>>>> killing is wrong, unless exceptionally there is a good overriding
>>>>>> case to demand or
>>>>>> permit it".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At that point I can go back to the intuitions, see what they tell
>>>>>> me, and flesh this one out.
>>>>>> A strong intuition e.g. is killing in self defense is permitted. I
>>>>>> can then try to find a
>>>>>> general rule that further justifies this intuition, e.g. again the
>>>>>> golden rule:
>>>>>> The attacker does not think of me as equal holder of rights,
>>>>>> therefore I too
>>>>>> don't need to do this with them, as a possible candidate. A weaker
>>>>>> (for me) intuition
>>>>>> would be that it may be permissible as retribution, and a possible
>>>>>> justification for
>>>>>> this intuition is that the deterrent effect saves other, innocent
>>>>>> lives. This then becomes
>>>>>> partly a factual question, and on reflection I would dismiss it as
>>>>>> a justification because
>>>>>> a) the data does not support it and b) it is also psychologically
>>>>>> implausible. I can then look
>>>>>> at my contradictory intuition that says the death penalty is
>>>>>> wrong, and justify it its need
>>>>>> to task third parties with killing defenceless people who did not
>>>>>> harm them (or a
>>>>>> range of other considerations, some of them again factual, e.g.:
>>>>>> miscarriages happen, it is
>>>>>> applied unevenly, etc)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Eventually, I should have a system where basic intuitions, rules
>>>>>> and constraining empirical facts
>>>>>> are in balance. This I can then apply to situations where the
>>>>>> intuitions are less clear or
>>>>>> entirely absent, and see what the rules would tell me. Sometimes
>>>>>> this then leads to
>>>>>> re-trained or sharpened intuitions (not all intuitions are sound)
>>>>>> , sometimes to refined or
>>>>>> adjusted rules, it is an always ongoing process to keep everything
>>>>>> is equilibrium. Here an
>>>>>> element of contingent social factors comes in: how an individual
>>>>>> balances in detail these
>>>>>> conflicting intuitions, and how they are applied to the individual
>>>>>> case, will differ between
>>>>>> societies and cultures
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As far as general rules are concerned, I mentioned the golden rule
>>>>>> already. This one for
>>>>>> me then gets concreteness by asking what the things are that we as
>>>>>> humans value for our
>>>>>> lives. For convenience the next I cite from our handout on data
>>>>>> ethics, though most
>>>>>> of this paragraph cam e I think from Shannon, not me:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "We all have vital interests in food, water, air, shelter, and
>>>>>> bodily integrity. But we also have
>>>>>> strong life interests in our health, happiness, family,
>>>>>> friendship, social reputation, liberty, autonomy,
>>>>>> knowledge, privacy, economic security, respectful and fair
>>>>>> treatment by others, education,
>>>>>> meaningful work, and opportunities for leisure, play,
>>>>>> entertainment, and creative and political
>>>>>> expression, among other things"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As I valued these things in my own life, and because the above
>>>>>> process gives me the golden
>>>>>> rule, acting in such a way that protects these interest also in
>>>>>> others would be
>>>>>> the next "layer" of general rules. Again, there is a biological
>>>>>> element in this: We happen to
>>>>>> have evolved into the type of species where the normal, healthy
>>>>>> member values these
>>>>>> things, which is why we find them across cultures and times.But
>>>>>> there is also room for society
>>>>>> and contingent historical factors: how these sometimes conflicting
>>>>>> values and interests are
>>>>>> reconciled will differ between societies - some will emphasise
>>>>>> economic security over
>>>>>> autonomy, others will give autonomy preference. Sometimes, these
>>>>>> disagreements will
>>>>>> be irreconcilable - a case where one has to agree to disagree.
>>>>>> Often, they can be resolved,
>>>>>> e.g. by showing that one approach also enhances a value where both
>>>>>> agree it should take
>>>>>> precedence, here for instance an interest in life and health.
>>>>>
>>>>> The following appeared years ago. I have never been able
>>>>> to find more on the research mentioned, and to make it
>>>>> harder, google confuses conscience with consciousness,
>>>>> but good read:
>>>>>
>>>>> <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/29632772.cms>
>>>>>
>>>>> "The part of the brain that makes humans superior to all
>>>>> known animals, and which also functions as the voice from
>>>>> within — popularly called conscience — has finally been
>>>>> found.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Scientists from the Oxford University have for the first
>>>>> time identified an area of the human brain that appears
>>>>> unlike anything in the brains of other primates. It is
>>>>> part of the Ventrolateral Frontal Cortex, a region of the
>>>>> brain known for over 150 years for being involved in many
>>>>> of the highest aspects of cognition and language."
>>>>>
>>>>> <see more at site... it doesn't like having passages
>>>>> copied to clipboards.>
>>>>>
>>>>> The takeaway is that the human "conscience" is an evolved
>>>>> part of the brain, and that human morality is innate and
>>>>> biological, not a consequence of religious belief.
>>>>>
>>>> I think morality is based upon whatever social standards that exist in
>>>> that society. Looking back through history standards changed.
>>> ......
>>>> In
>>>> primitive societies the standards were different from what we in the
>>>> judo-christian world accept.
>>>
>>> Ah, traditional Judo-Christian values.....Love your enemy, and use
>>> his strength against him.
>>>
>> That is _your_ interpretation! I'm not surprised.
>
> You've already had one Chez Watt spelling for that misspelling. The word
> you might have been trying to use is Judeo-Christian.
>