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Hash: SHA256

This is what I currently have in my config:

pool:
size: 5
rate: 60
min_send: 5
loop: 300

Should I adjust these settings at all to reduce latency?

Thanks!

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On 2022-07-25 23:21, Middleman Remailer Administrator wrote:
> This is what I currently have in my config:
>
> pool:
> size: 5
> rate: 60
> min_send: 5
> loop: 300
>
> Should I adjust these settings at all to reduce latency?
>
> Thanks!
>

When I was running my Cloaked Yamn remailer my pool settings were
similar to yours. I think my rate was 70.

There is very little traffic in the Yamn network at present. This, I
think, contributes to the higher latency we are seeing at many remailers.

Tncmm manages to attain a faster latency by using a pool size of 0. That
is one solution at your disposal.

--
SEC3

YAMN Tutorials - https://sec3.net/yamnhelp

SEC3 <admin@sec3.net> wrote:

> Tncmm manages to attain a faster latency by using a pool size of 0. That
> is one solution at your disposal.

Should be allowed, as the name 'Yamn' doesn't contain the term 'Mix'.

<https://mixmin.net/yamn/thesaurus/25.conf>

Lightning-fast, but purpose defeated.

| Remailer-Type: Mixmaster 0.2c
| Supported Formats:
| Mixmaster
| Pool size: 0
| Maximum message size: 12 kB
^^^^^

And that's another reason why I stay with Mixmaster remailers.

| The following header lines will be filtered:
|
| $remailer{"tncmm"} = "<yamn@tnetconsulting.net> middle v2";
|
| SUPPORTED MIXMASTER (TYPE II) REMAILERS

???

| fragged yamn@fragged.tearable.org 6d97fa2379c750b6845119b169f36a81 4:0.2.6 M 2022-07-18 2022-08-01
| frell nyam@remailer.frell.eu.org 9bc86d743cdc1ca35793ea7ddaa29996 4:0.2c E 2022-07-17 2022-07-31
| middleman yamn@middleman.remailer.online 228b5843c8b67b622378140310b63fd9 4:0.2.6 M 2022-07-21 2022-08-04
| paranoyamn yamn@yamn.paranoici.org 2b17d98a5299f9ed8bc2cc929a0be8c2 4:0.2c E 2022-07-19 2022-08-02
| sinless yamn@sinless.space 1072c718142a6dfab15c43a27971a803 4:0.2.6 M 2022-07-20 2022-08-03
| tncmm yamn@tnetconsulting.net 565a8d4bf8c1063fe3dc9996909b4f85 4:0.2c M 2022-07-20 2022-08-03
| victor yamn@virebent.art 8502065c6fd750a1b6625f03de7da20d 4:0.2c M 2022-07-25 2022-08-08
| yamn2 yamn2@mixmin.net fb93c7e6e52397c99100de4c9a676c43 4:0.2.4 E 2022-07-16 2022-07-30
| yamn3 yamn3@mixmin.net 48109aeba7b7d9f1fa7c88bf18497cc4 4:0.2.4 E 2022-07-23 2022-08-06
| yamn4 yamn4@mixmin.net 6cd94e6b71bc24ba109fb3213b7531c5 4:0.2.6 M 2022-07-13 2022-07-27

Anonymous wrote:

>| Pool size: 0

Kind of a dummy remailer

>| Maximum message size: 12 kB

in a Twitter remailer network.

Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
> Anonymous wrote:
>
> >| Pool size: 0
>
> Kind of a dummy remailer
>
> >| Maximum message size: 12 kB
>
> in a Twitter remailer network.

The YAMN network is working fine for me.

Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:
> Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
> >
> > Anonymous wrote:
> >
> > >| Pool size: 0
> >
> > Kind of a dummy remailer
> >
> > >| Maximum message size: 12 kB
> >
> > in a Twitter remailer network.
>
> The YAMN network is working fine for me.

You'll know when they're knocking on your door.

BTW, there's a syntax error in your references header entry, which
beyond that doesn't match the quoted text.

> References: <tbnmkh$1e9k$1@gioia.aioe.org><DArvuYJOxxmNfJxJbfmKsAXyxMmvTifU@news.usenet.farm>
> <4196071074db7be8d6384a38083cc477@remailer.paranoici.org>

RFC 1036:

| 2.2.5. References
|
| This field lists the Message-ID's of any messages prompting the
| submission of this message. It is required for all follow-up
| messages, and forbidden when a new subject is raised.
| Implementations should provide a follow-up command, which allows a
| user to post a follow-up message. This command should generate a
| "Subject" line which is the same as the original message, except
| that if the original subject does not begin with "Re:" or "re:", the
| four characters "Re:" are inserted before the subject. If there is
| no "References" line on the original header, the "References" line
| should contain the Message-ID of the original message (including the
| angle brackets). If the original message does have a "References"
| line, the follow-up message should have a "References" line
| containing the text of the original "References" line, a blank, and
^^^^^^^
| the Message-ID of the original message.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

HTH

On 7/30/2022 11:40 AM, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:
>> Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Anonymous wrote:
>>>
>>>> | Pool size: 0
>>>
>>> Kind of a dummy remailer
>>>
>>>> | Maximum message size: 12 kB
>>>
>>> in a Twitter remailer network.
>>
>> The YAMN network is working fine for me.
>
> You'll know when they're knocking on your door.

That is FUD.

Horseshit.

Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:

>On 7/30/2022 11:40 AM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>
>> Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:
>>> Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Anonymous wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> | Pool size: 0
>>>>
>>>> Kind of a dummy remailer
>>>>
>>>>> | Maximum message size: 12 kB
>>>>
>>>> in a Twitter remailer network.
>>>
>>> The YAMN network is working fine for me.
>>
>> You'll know when they're knocking on your door.
>
>
>That is FUD.
>
>Horseshit.

Sure? Well, so would you be so kind as to explain how such a
snake oil remailer with pool size ZERO can help us gain anonymity?

On 7/30/2022 6:15 PM, Anonymous wrote:

> Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:
>
>> On 7/30/2022 11:40 AM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>>
>>> Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:
>>>> Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Anonymous wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> | Pool size: 0
>>>>>
>>>>> Kind of a dummy remailer
>>>>>
>>>>>> | Maximum message size: 12 kB
>>>>>
>>>>> in a Twitter remailer network.
>>>>
>>>> The YAMN network is working fine for me.
>>>
>>> You'll know when they're knocking on your door.
>>
>>
>> That is FUD.
>>
>> Horseshit.
>
> Sure? Well, so would you be so kind as to explain how such a
> snake oil remailer with pool size ZERO can help us gain anonymity?
>

I take issue with your statement, "You'll know when they're knocking on
your door." I define that statement as classic FUD. You present no
evidence, nor can you, that a single remailer with a pool size 0 in any
way compromises your individual anonymity. Thus, I discount your
statement as FUD. Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt. It's not helpful.

To frame this discussion, the issue is traffic analysis. That's really
what this is all about. We are talking about latency. Latency is defined
as the time it takes for a dataset to travel from one end point to
another. And how observable is that traffic and can it be correlated. It
is arguable, that we are talking about a global passive adversary with
unlimited reach and unlimited resources. That's a pretty tall mountain
to scale in any set of circumstances. Historically, Mix networks have
been very resistant to traffic analysis.

If you object to the behavior of a particular remailer, you are free to
bar that remailer from your chains. All one needs to achieve anonymity
is one uncompromised chain.

On Sun, 31 Jul 2022 19:37:23 +0000 Anonymous wrote:

>If you object to the behavior of a particular remailer, you are free to
>bar that remailer from your chains.

??? And how will a normal remailer user get knowlege of such an issue ???

Therefore it's extremely important to make any trouble spots public.
Otherwise remailer users may run into danger without knowing. Thanks!

On 8/1/2022 4:55 AM, Anon wrote:

> On Sun, 31 Jul 2022 19:37:23 +0000 Anonymous wrote:
>
>> If you object to the behavior of a particular remailer, you are free to
>> bar that remailer from your chains.
>
> ??? And how will a normal remailer user get knowlege of such an issue ???
>
> Therefore it's extremely important to make any trouble spots public.
> Otherwise remailer users may run into danger without knowing. Thanks!
>

It was absolutely correct to post the issue here so that users can be
aware. We all support that.

I still take issue with inflammatory language such as "knock at the
door" and "danger." I don't see that at all. But everyone must decide
for themselves.

Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:

>On 7/30/2022 6:15 PM, Anonymous wrote:
>
>> Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:
>>
>>> On 7/30/2022 11:40 AM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>>>
>>>> Anonymous Remailer <remailer@domain.invalid> wrote:
>>>>> Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anonymous wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> | Pool size: 0
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind of a dummy remailer
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> | Maximum message size: 12 kB
>>>>>>
>>>>>> in a Twitter remailer network.
>>>>>
>>>>> The YAMN network is working fine for me.
>>>>
>>>> You'll know when they're knocking on your door.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is FUD.
>>>
>>> Horseshit.
>>
>> Sure? Well, so would you be so kind as to explain how such a
>> snake oil remailer with pool size ZERO can help us gain anonymity?
>>
>
>
>I take issue with your statement, "You'll know when they're knocking on
>your door." I define that statement as classic FUD. You present no
>evidence, nor can you, that a single remailer with a pool size 0 in any
>way compromises your individual anonymity. Thus, I discount your
>statement as FUD. Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt. It's not helpful.
>
>To frame this discussion, the issue is traffic analysis. That's really
>what this is all about. We are talking about latency. Latency is defined
>as the time it takes for a dataset to travel from one end point to
>another. And how observable is that traffic and can it be correlated. It
>is arguable, that we are talking about a global passive adversary with
>unlimited reach and unlimited resources. That's a pretty tall mountain
>to scale in any set of circumstances. Historically, Mix networks have
>been very resistant to traffic analysis.
>
>If you object to the behavior of a particular remailer, you are free to
>bar that remailer from your chains. All one needs to achieve anonymity
>is one uncompromised chain.

I still don't get it. How can a remailer with a zero-pool strategy add
to your anonymity? You don't have to compromise such a remailer to
assign incoming to outgoing message packets correctly. Just wait
outside and observe its traffic. And, btw, without any message mixing,
latency doesn't matter at all in low-traffic situations. You just have
to wait a few minutes longer to get things straight. The initial
posting was even about measures to reduce latency somehow, not to
increase it, which would be beneficial particularly regarding Yamn's
meager message throughput.

Sure, 'Mix networks have been very resistant to traffic analyses', but
zero-pool remailers don't fall into that category, as they miss the
essential mixing pool feature.

I hope, that makes my position on this topic somewhat clearer. It's not
about me spreading FUD. It's about pseudo-remailer operators, who,
possibly with no ill intent, offer snake oil instead of playing by the
rules, and by doing so undermine the deservedly excellent reputation of
anonymous remailing.

Keep on mixing!

<https://www.haph.org/yamn/thesaurus/>
<https://www.mixmin.net/echolot/thesaurus/>

On Mon, 1 Aug 2022 20:22:30 +0100, Anonymous Remailer wrote:

>It was absolutely correct to post the issue here so that users can be
>aware. We all support that.
>
>I still take issue with inflammatory language such as "knock at the
>door" and "danger." I don't see that at all. But everyone must decide
>for themselves.

Well that's fair enough.

> It was absolutely correct to post the issue here so that users can be
> aware. We all support that.
>
> I still take issue with inflammatory language such as "knock at the
> door" and "danger." I don't see that at all. But everyone must decide
> for themselves.

You have to keep in mind, that anonymous remailing is a serious
business, and certain user groups like whistleblowers or dissidents
may indeed be in great danger when remailers leak out their identity.
They also won't be aware of it up until the bad guys breach their door.

On 2022-08-02, Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:

> You have to keep in mind, that anonymous remailing is a serious
> business,

Nah, it's not.

> and certain user groups like whistleblowers or dissidents
> may indeed be in great danger when remailers leak out their identity.

They don't use remailers. Only a very small group of privacy wonks even
knows about anonymous remailers. Their main use is trolling usenet and that
doesn't require any pool size.

On 8/2/2022 9:22 AM, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> On 2022-08-02, Anonymous <nobody@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
>> You have to keep in mind, that anonymous remailing is a serious
>> business,
>
> Nah, it's not.
>
>> and certain user groups like whistleblowers or dissidents
>> may indeed be in great danger when remailers leak out their identity.
>
> They don't use remailers. Only a very small group of privacy wonks even
> knows about anonymous remailers. Their main use is trolling usenet and that
> doesn't require any pool size.
>

That is absolutely true.

Remailers aren't "serious business" anymore. Those days are long gone.

Nobody uses Remaliers except for a handful of Usenet wingnuts.

On 8/2/2022 6:49 AM, Anonymous wrote:

>> It was absolutely correct to post the issue here so that users can be
>> aware. We all support that.
>>
>> I still take issue with inflammatory language such as "knock at the
>> door" and "danger." I don't see that at all. But everyone must decide
>> for themselves.
>
>
> You have to keep in mind, that anonymous remailing is a serious
> business, and certain user groups like whistleblowers or dissidents
> may indeed be in great danger when remailers leak out their identity.
> They also won't be aware of it up until the bad guys breach their door.
>

If your door gets breached through a simple remailer message, the
authorities already know way more about what you're up to than your
remailer messages. You have way bigger problems than remailing.

On 8/2/2022 6:49 AM, Anonymous wrote:

>> It was absolutely correct to post the issue here so that users can be
>> aware. We all support that.
>>
>> I still take issue with inflammatory language such as "knock at the
>> door" and "danger." I don't see that at all. But everyone must decide
>> for themselves.
>
>
> You have to keep in mind, that anonymous remailing is a serious
> business, and certain user groups like whistleblowers or dissidents
> may indeed be in great danger when remailers leak out their identity.
> They also won't be aware of it up until the bad guys breach their door.
>

Really?

Please explain how remailers "leak out their identity?"

You mean their IP address?

How do you see that happening when each Mixmaster node strips way
all traces from the previous node?

And if you're using Tor as your injection point how and where will your
true IP be exposed?

On 8/2/2022 6:49 AM, Anonymous wrote:

>> It was absolutely correct to post the issue here so that users can be
>> aware. We all support that.
>>
>> I still take issue with inflammatory language such as "knock at the
>> door" and "danger." I don't see that at all. But everyone must decide
>> for themselves.
>
>
> You have to keep in mind, that anonymous remailing is a serious
> business, and certain user groups like whistleblowers or dissidents
> may indeed be in great danger when remailers leak out their identity.
> They also won't be aware of it up until the bad guys breach their door.
>

I respect your devotion to remailing. I feel the same. And to my dying
breath, I still believe it is arguably the most anonymous form of
communication ever devised.

That being said, you are ascribing way too much importance to remailing.

Why? Because remailing is 1995 technology and few if any use it any more
aside from a few aging Usenet hobbyists. I wish it weren't so.

The number of nodes continues to get smaller and smaller. 10 nodes
and 4 exits. I'd never thought I would see that day. Remailer usage
is arguably very minimal. In days gone by, a remailer wouuld drop off
and it hardly caused a stir. Now we lose a remailer and it makes you
shudder. No one comes forward to take their place. There is a story in that.

In anonymity circles, no one talks about remailing anymore and most
people don't even know what it is. Traffic in apas used to be like a
wildfire on a daily basis. Now there's hardly anything at all. There is
a story in that.

Remailing is largely ineffective for "whistleblowers and dissidents"
unless you're using a Nym with 2 way communication. Take a look at how
many Nym users there are at the 2 remaining Nym servers. A few hundred
maybe if that?

In the old days the fantasy was an abused or battered wife would use
remailers to notify authorities that she was in danger. That was the
storyline. That was the logic.

Try an experiment: Send a standard remailer message through a series of
chains to a bonfide email address. Over 50% of the time that life and
death message will wind up in a spam folder. I have tried. It is not
a practical form of communication.

Times have changed.

Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:

> I respect your devotion to remailing. I feel the same. And to my dying
> breath, I still believe it is arguably the most anonymous form of
> communication ever devised.

> Times have changed.

Modern times. Universal transparency. Anonymity gone. Hallelujah!

On 8/3/2022 10:09 AM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
> Anonymous <nobody@yamn.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
>> I respect your devotion to remailing. I feel the same. And to my dying
>> breath, I still believe it is arguably the most anonymous form of
>> communication ever devised.
>
>> Times have changed.
>
> Modern times. Universal transparency. Anonymity gone. Hallelujah!
>

That's basically true.

Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> On 8/2/2022 6:49 AM, Anonymous wrote:
>
> > You have to keep in mind, that anonymous remailing
> > is a serious business, and certain user groups
> > like whistleblowers or dissidents may indeed be
> > in great danger when remailers leak out their identity.
> > They also won't be aware of it up until the bad guys
> > breach their door.
> >
>
> Really?
>
> Please explain how remailers "leak out their identity?"
>
> You mean their IP address?
>
> How do you see that happening when each Mixmaster node
> strips way all traces from the previous node?
>
> And if you're using Tor as your injection point
> how and where will your true IP be exposed?

You are right !

Use OMNIMix which uses TOR and Mixmaster or YAMN
https://www.danner-net.de/om.htm