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interests / rocksolid.shared.news / Re: Canada learns from China, introduces social scoring

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* Canada learns from China, introduces social scoring48353858358
`- Canada learns from China, introduces social scoringAnonUser

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Canada learns from China, introduces social scoring

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Subject: Canada learns from China, introduces social scoring
Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 15:18:43+0000
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 by: 48353858358 - Wed, 29 May 2019 15:18 UTC

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kzdp5v/police-in-canada-are-tracking-peoples-negative-behavior-in-a-risk-database

Quote/
“We can knock on someone’s door and say, ‘We’re so worried about you, can we come in and chat?’”
/Quote

Man, they are really afraid now.

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Re: Canada learns from China, introduces social scoring

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From: AnonU...@rslight.i2p (AnonUser)
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Subject: Re: Canada learns from China, introduces social scoring
Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 09:04:07 -0000 (UTC)
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 by: AnonUser - Thu, 30 May 2019 09:04 UTC

but of course it's just more surveillance. The article about surveillance
below is interesting and covers some of the excuses or diversions used

The Ethics of Surveillance
https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/ethics-of-surveillance/ethics.html

Introduction to Surveillance

Surveillance is, simply put, the observation and/or monitoring of a
person. Coming from the French word for "looking upon," the term
encompasses not only visual observation but also the scrutiny of all
behavior, speech, and actions. Prominent examples of surveillance include
surveillance cameras, wiretaps, GPS tracking, and internet surveillance.

One-way observation is in some ways an expression of control. Just as
having a stranger stare at you for an extended period of time can be
uncomfortable and hostile, it is no different from being under constant
surveillance, except that surveillance is often done surreptitiously and
at the behest of some authority.

Todays technological capabilities take surveillance to new levels; no
longer are spyglasses and "dropping" from the eaves of a roof necessary to
observe individuals - the government can and does utilize methods to
observe all the behavior and actions of people without the need for a spy
to be physically present. Clearly, these advances in technology have a
profound impact with regards to the ethics of placing individual under
surveillance&emdash;in our modern society, where so many of our actions
are observable, recorded, searchable, and traceable, close surveillance is
much more intrusive than it has been in the past.
Surveillance and Physical Searches

Particularly interesting about government surveillance is that in the
United States surveillance is not held to the same standards of
accountability&emdash;as the Constitution protects American citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures, physical searches of individuals may
not be conducted without a warrant issued by a judge. However, after the
passage of FISA and subsequent laws, citizens have not been given the same
protection with regards to electronic surveillance. As there have been
massive changes in technology and lifestyle since the 1970s, electronic
surveillance could be considered much more invasive than a physical
search, yet as has been made clear in the legal section of this website,
it is in fact much easier for government agents to perform surveillance.
Why there is such disparity between these standards to us a matter of
serious concern.
"If you haven't done anything wrong, you have nothing to fear."

This is a typical argument used by governments and other groups to justify
their spying activities. Upon cursory inspection, it seems to make
sense&emdash;as most people are law-abiding citizens, most ostensibly will
not be targeted for surveillance and it will not impact their lives, while
making their lives more comfortable and safer through the elimination of
criminals. Thus, the government's use of closed-circuit television cameras
in public spaces, warrantless wiretapping, and library record checks have
the potential to save lives from criminals and terrorists with only
minimal invasion of its citizens' privacy.

First, as a mental exercise, we ask that the reader consider that these
arguments could easily be applied to asking all citizens to carry location
tracking devices&emdash;it would make tracing criminal acts much easier,
and that it could easily be argued that people refusing to carry these
devices only do so because they have something to hide. It is a matter of
course that most people in our society would object to this solution, not
because they wish to commit any wrongdoings, but because it is invasive
and prone to abuse. Now consider that, given current technology, the
government already has the ability to track a known target's movements to
a reasonable degree, and has easy access to information such as one's
purchasing habits, online activities, phone conversations, and mail.
Though implementing mandatory location tracking devices for the whole
population is certainly more invasive than the above, we argue that
current practices are analogous, extreme, and equally unacceptable.

Next, this argument fails to take into consideration a number of important
issues when collecting personally identifiable data or
recordings&emdash;first, that such practices create an archive of
information that is vulnerable to abuse by trusted insiders; one example
emerged in September of 2007 when Benjamin Robinson, a special agent of
the Department of Commerce, was indicted for using a government database
called the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) for tracking
the travel patterns of an ex-girlfriend and her family. Records show that
he used the system illegally at least 163 times before he was caught (Mark
2007). With the expansion of surveillance, such abuses could become more
numerous and more egregious as the amount of personal data collected
increases.

In addition, allowing surreptitious surveillance of one form, even limited
in scope and for a particular contingency, encourages government to expand
such surveillance programs in the future. It is our view that the danger
of a "slippery slope" scenario cannot be dismissed as paranoia - as a
prominent example, the collection of biometric has expanded immensely in
the past several years. Many schools in the UK collect fingerprints of
children as young as six without parental consent (Doward 2006), and
fingerprinting in American schools has been widespread since the
mid-eighties (NYT National Desk 1983). Now, the discussion has shifted
towards DNA collection&emdash;British police are now pushing for the DNA
collection of children who "exhibit behavior indicating they may become
criminals in later life" (Townsend and Asthana 2008), while former New
York City mayor Rudy Giuliani has encouraged the collection of DNA data of
newborns (Lambert 1998).

When data is collected, whether such data remains used for its stated
purpose after its collection has been called into question, even by
government officials: the European Data Protection Supervisor has
acknowledged that even when two databases of information are created for
specific, distinct purposes, in a phenomenon known as 'function creep'
they could be combined with one another to form a third with a purpose for
which the first two were not built (eGov Monitor Weekly 2006). This
non-uniqueness and immutability of information provides great potential
for abuse by individuals and institutions.
When is surveillance appropriate?

Many different groups define appropriate bounds for surveillance in
different manners. One viewpoint that we have found interesting is that of
M.I.T. professor Gary Marx, who argued that before implementing
surveillance we should evaluate the proposed methods by asking a number of
questions, which we enumerate below:

A. The Means

Harm: does the technique cause unwarranted physical or psychological harm?

Boundary: does the technique cross a personal boundary without permission
(whether involving coercion or deception or a body, relational or spatial
border)?

Trust: does the technique violate assumptions that are made about how
personal information will be treated such as no secret recordings?

Personal relationships: is the tactic applied in a personal or impersonal
setting?

Invalidity: does the technique produce invalid results?

B. The Data Collection Context

Awareness: are individuals aware that personal information is being
collected, who seeks it and why?

Consent: do individuals consent to the data collection?

Golden rule: would those responsbile for the surveillance (both the
decision to apply it and its actual application) agree to be its subjects
under the conditions in which they apply it to others?

Minimization: does a principle of minimization apply?

Public decision-making: was the decision to use a tactic arrived at
through some public discussion and decision making process?

Human review: is there human review of machine generated results?

Right of inspection: are people aware of the findings and how they were
created?

Right to challenge and express a grievance: are there procedures for
challenging the results, or for entering alternative data or
interpretations into the record?

Redress and sanctions: if the individual has been treated unfairly and
procedures violated, are there appropriate means of redress? Are there
means for discovering violations and penalties to encourage responsible
surveillant behavior?

Adequate data stewardship and protection: can the security of the data be
adequately protected?

Equality-inequality regarding availability and application: a) is the
means widely available or restricted to only the most wealthy, powerful or
technologically sophisticated? b) within a setting is the tactic broadly
applied to all people or only to those less powerful or unable to resist
c) if there are means of resisting the provision of personal information
are these equally available, or restricted to the most privileged?


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