On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>
>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>
>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>
>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>
>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>> although its implications are?
>>
>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>
> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.

My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.

> And that one
> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
> itself.

I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.

> Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
> itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
> down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
> experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
> to do so.

--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell

On 4/28/24 9:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, Mark Isaak
> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>
>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>
>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>
>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>
>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>> although its implications are?
>>
>> No detectable difference between the two.
>
> Perhaps you should contact all those philosophers who spend so much
> time debating the difference and tell them they are wasting their
> time.

We're on USENET. Who are we to judge wasting time?

--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell

On 4/26/24 11:57 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, Mark Isaak
> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>
>> On 4/26/24 12:27 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>>>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>>>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
>>>>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>>>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You missed his point.
>>>>>>>> Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
>>>>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
>>>>>>>> the right fork?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
>>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
>>>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
>>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
>>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
>>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
>>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
>>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
>>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
>>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
>>>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
>>>>>>>> it was better.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
>>>>>>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
>>>>>>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
>>>>>>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
>>>>>>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
>>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
>>>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
>>>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
>>>>>>> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
>>>>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
>>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
>>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
>>>>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
>>>>>>> reach the same decision.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
>>>>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
>>>>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
>>>>>> one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
>>>>>> tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
>>>>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
>>>>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
>>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
>>>>>> various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
>>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
>>>>>> kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
>>>>>
>>>>> Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
>>>>> underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
>>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
>>>>> that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
>>>>> benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
>>>>> more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
>>>>> not the trait well survive.
>>>>>
>>>>> What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
>>>>> involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
>>>>> identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
>>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
>>>>
>>>> I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
>>>> tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
>>>> marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
>>>
>>> It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
>>> (free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
>>> pondering makes no difference.
>>>
>>>> As
>>>> for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
>>>> decision is predetermined).
>>>
>>> I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
>>> predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
>>> them.
>>
>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>
>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>
>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>
> No, that is not at all how determinism works. It does not say that if
> you move to Tibet you will somehow feel the to buy that house inn the
> USA. What determinism says is that if you move to Tibet, you will
> decide to buy a different house but that decision has not been a free
> will one, it was a result of your conditions changing (moving to
> Tibet). Your change of country, however, was also not a free will
> choice, it in turn was the result of other conditions and preceding
> events:
>
> "If determinism is true, then as soon as the Big Bang took place 13
> billion years ago, the entire history of the universe was already
> settled. Every event that's ever occurred was already predetermined
> before it occurred. And this includes human decisions. If determinism
> is true, then everything you've ever done - every choice you've ever
> made - was already predetermined before our solar system even existed.
> And if this is true, then it has obvious implications for free will.
>
> Suppose that you're in an ice cream parlor, waiting in line, trying to
> decide whether to order chocolate or vanilla ice cream. And suppose
> that when you get to the front of the line, you decide to order
> chocolate. Was this choice a product of your free will? Well, if
> determinism is true, then your choice was completely caused by prior
> events. The immediate causes of the decision were neural events that
> occurred in your brain just prior to your choice. But, of course, if
> determinism is true, then those neural events that caused your
> decision had physical causes as well; they were caused by even earlier
> events - events that occurred just before they did. And so on,
> stretching back into the past. We can follow this back to when you
> were a baby, to the very first events of your life. In fact, we can
> keep going back before that, because if determinism is true, then
> those first events were also caused by prior events. We can keep going
> back to events that occurred before you were even conceived, to events
> involving your mother and father and a bottle of Chianti.
>
> So if determinism is true, then it was already settled before you were
> born that you were going to order chocolate ice cream when you got to
> the front of the line. And, of course, the same can be said about all
> of our decisions, and it seems to follow from this that human beings
> do not have free will."
>
> https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/determinism-classical-argument-against-free-will-failure/
>
> That full article is well worth a read, he covers a range of issues
> including the arguments between determinists like Einstein and
> indeterminists like Heisenberg and Bohr.

On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 15:12:31 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:

>On 27/04/2024 10:09, Martin Harran wrote:

I'm snipping a lot of stuff here because I think some of the
discussion is moving towards endless circles. Also, my time for this
is a bit limited so I'm cutting to what I think are some of the key
points.

[…]

>I'm a bit confused because you said earlier that "you accept science can
>only study visible behavior" but now it seems you categorize gravity as
>non-visible while agreeing it's something science can and does study.

I meant that gravity does have visible 'behaviour' - we can see the
apple falling from the tree and start to test/quantify different
things falling from different heights and so on.

[…]

>
>In terms of why I originally brought this up, I was responding to your
>statement that "science cannot explain consciousness of which
>decision-making is a subset". I probably misread the sentence as saying
>science cannot explain those things *in principle* when you actually
>just meant that science can't explain them *right now*.

Yes, I meant science can't explain them right *now* but I also
expressed my opinion that science is focused on a particular approach
- neurological research - which I don't think will *on its own*
provide an explanation.

>Even so I'm
>surprised at the idea that science currently cannot explain
>decision-making - but then I'm not sure what level of explanation you
>were thinking of with that sentence.

Science can explain the neurological process that go on inside the
brain whilst we are making decisions but cannot explain how we arrive
at a particular decision.

>
>But all that to say "visible" in this context referred to the fact that
>if we think of consciousness as causing our visible behavior, then
>science absolutely could explain it in principle. And I probably
>misunderstood you when I thought this was something you might disagree with.

As I've said before, neurology has allowed us to get an incredible
understanding of the 'mechanics' of the brain but also as I've said
before, I see that like an electronics engineer who has an incredible
depth of knowledge about the electronic processes going on in my
computer but that doesn't give him any understanding about the ideas I
am using that computer to express.

[…]

>
>Science doesn't reject dualism in principle, it rejects it because no
>dualism hypothesis meets the standards of a scientific hypothesis. "I
>think we should be able to figure out ways of studying the effects and
>symptoms that would come from dualism" is exactly correct! Can you give
>examples of such effects or symptoms?

Okay, to take an area that intrigues me. If our mind is just the
products of our body, I would expect it to be under the control of
that body. In practice, however, it is a two-way process- our minds
can also control our bodies. For example, placebos can "cure" people
even though they have no medicinal value whatsoever. Or take
hypnotism; someone can put me into a hypnotic state where I no longer
feel pain. That hypnosis is induced by an external force which shows
that control of our mind is not confined to our own bodies.

Just to be clear, I'm not saying these are validation of dualism but
they are indicators of our minds being capable of being influenced by
*external* forces.

[…]

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:

>On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>
>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>
>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>
>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>> although its implications are?
>>>
>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>
>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>
>My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>
>> And that one
>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>> itself.
>
>I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>
Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...". It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
>
>> Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
>> itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
>> down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
>> experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
>> to do so.
--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 07:42:01 -0700, erik simpson
<eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:

>On 4/28/24 11:12 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
>> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> So I guess you’ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak
>>> Chopra?
>>
>> What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas
>> and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand?
>>
>> Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take
>> on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say
>> rather than what they did say?
>>
>>
>> [...]
>>
>The main problem with this group is that we don't have nearly as many
>cranks and nutters as formerly. Let's all resolve to be at least
>occasionally unreasonable in order to maintain mental muscle tone.

The problem with that idea is that I never tolerated the previous
cranks and nutters making up shit about me so, in order to maintain
the environment, I can't tolerate it from their replacements.

On 4/28/24 8:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>
>> On 4/27/24 1:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>
> [big snip for focus]
>
>>>
>>> No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
>>> because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
>>> practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
>>> science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
>>> that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
>>> study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
>>> figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
>>> studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
>>
>> As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
>> effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
>
> If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
> an example or two.

Dualism implies that brain stimulation should not affect mind (it does),
and an organ through which mind influences brain (never found).

>> Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
>> has been studied and found wanting.
>>
>>> I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
>>> difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
>>> door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
>>> Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
>>> that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
>>> everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
>>> and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
>>> book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
>>> considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
>>> "the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
>>
>> Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
>> familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
>> read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
>
> Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
> about.
>
> The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who
> started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
> dispel supernatural ideas.
>
>>
>>> I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
>>> certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
>>> Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
>>> baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
>>> magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
>>> language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
>>> reason. It is heresy."
>>
>> How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
>
> Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.
>
> An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
> science would be useful.
>
>
>> If anything can
>> happen, how do you test for "anything"?
>>
>>> 'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
>>
>> Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
>> useful as a metaphor.
>
> Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
> driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
> answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
> orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful
> scientists who shared that understanding.

This raises the larger issue of pseudoscience as a whole. It is a
humungous field, which includes issues that range from wasting people's
time to killing people outright to starting world wars. Scientists are
reluctant to most of such issues because (a) they *are* a huge waste of
time, and (b) responding is often cited by the crackpots as proof that
they are being taken seriously, so they must be right. If the issues get
big enough (e.g. homeopathy), then they are worth debunking. But usually
not before.

Sheldrake was enough of a scientist to know how to make his case
scientifically. He tried to do so. And his case has been unproductive.
Some of his studies can't be replicated. Others are vague. If he is
right, then where are all the telepaths he says exist?

--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell

Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>
>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>
>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>
>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>> although its implications are?
>>>
>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>
>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>
> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>
>> And that one
>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>> itself.
>
> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>
Determinism and free will are not incompatible.

Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 07:42:01 -0700, erik simpson
> <eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 4/28/24 11:12 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
>>> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> So I guess you’ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak
>>>> Chopra?
>>>
>>> What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas
>>> and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand?
>>>
>>> Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take
>>> on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say
>>> rather than what they did say?
>>>
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>> The main problem with this group is that we don't have nearly as many
>> cranks and nutters as formerly. Let's all resolve to be at least
>> occasionally unreasonable in order to maintain mental muscle tone.
>
> The problem with that idea is that I never tolerated the previous
> cranks and nutters making up shit about me so, in order to maintain
> the environment, I can't tolerate it from their replacements.
>
Good way to avoid following up on my points per Gould vs Teilhard or to my
posting evidence that the field of developmental biology has gotten along
fine invoking morphogenetic fields without needing Sheldrake’s spooky psi
nonsense.

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:

>Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>
>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>
>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>
>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>
>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>
>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>
>>> And that one
>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>> itself.
>>
>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>
>Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
>
Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
accurate:
"Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
causally inevitable."

To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.

(This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
>
--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

On 4/29/24 1:29 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appeared
> in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
>
>> Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>>
>>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>>
>>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>>
>>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>>
>>>> And that one
>>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>>> itself.
>>>
>>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>>
>> Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
>>
> Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
> accurate:
> "Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
> the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
> causally inevitable."
>
> To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
> will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
> decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.
>
> (This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
> philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
> have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
>>
Re this topic: Did Nando survive the end-google-groups catastrophe? He
was an expert on the subject of making choices (sometimes impossible ones).

Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appeared
> in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
>
>> Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>>
>>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>>
>>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>>
>>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>>
>>>> And that one
>>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>>> itself.
>>>
>>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>>
>> Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
>>
> Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
> accurate:
> "Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
> the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
> causally inevitable."
>
> To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
> will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
> decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.
>
> (This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
> philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
> have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
>
Well compatibilism is a thing. The now late Daniel Dennett was a proponent.

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:30:36 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:

>Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 07:42:01 -0700, erik simpson
>> <eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/28/24 11:12 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
>>>> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>>> So I guess you?ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak
>>>>> Chopra?
>>>>
>>>> What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas
>>>> and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand?
>>>>
>>>> Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take
>>>> on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say
>>>> rather than what they did say?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>> The main problem with this group is that we don't have nearly as many
>>> cranks and nutters as formerly. Let's all resolve to be at least
>>> occasionally unreasonable in order to maintain mental muscle tone.
>>
>> The problem with that idea is that I never tolerated the previous
>> cranks and nutters making up shit about me so, in order to maintain
>> the environment, I can't tolerate it from their replacements.
>>
>Good way to avoid following up on my points per Gould vs Teilhard or to my
>posting evidence that the field of developmental biology has gotten along
>fine invoking morphogenetic fields without needing Sheldrake’s spooky psi
>nonsense.

You won't be getting any follow up now. I won't waste my limited time
trying to have a rational discussion with someone who just makes up
shit about me.

Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:30:36 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
>
>> Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 07:42:01 -0700, erik simpson
>>> <eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 4/28/24 11:12 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
>>>>> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>>>> So I guess you?ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak
>>>>>> Chopra?
>>>>>
>>>>> What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas
>>>>> and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand?
>>>>>
>>>>> Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take
>>>>> on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say
>>>>> rather than what they did say?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>> The main problem with this group is that we don't have nearly as many
>>>> cranks and nutters as formerly. Let's all resolve to be at least
>>>> occasionally unreasonable in order to maintain mental muscle tone.
>>>
>>> The problem with that idea is that I never tolerated the previous
>>> cranks and nutters making up shit about me so, in order to maintain
>>> the environment, I can't tolerate it from their replacements.
>>>
>> Good way to avoid following up on my points per Gould vs Teilhard or to my
>> posting evidence that the field of developmental biology has gotten along
>> fine invoking morphogenetic fields without needing Sheldrake’s spooky psi
>> nonsense.
>
> You won't be getting any follow up now. I won't waste my limited time
> trying to have a rational discussion with someone who just makes up
> shit about me.
>
Fine with me.

On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>
>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>
>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>
>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>
>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>
>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>
>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>
>>> And that one
>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>> itself.
>>
>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>
> Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
> and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
> something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
> reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
> choice, but as for testing it...".

Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?

>It's sometimes amusing to
> discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
> number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
> becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
> even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
> noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
> validity of personal experience.

My, somewhat vague and evolving, view is that it feels like I experience
'qualia' and 'make choices' between alternatives and that I am not
special, so others who report the same are not philosophical zombies
deterministically lying to me. It is a 'real thing'. I see two
possibilities. There is some unknown, evidenced phenomenon unrelated to
known physics somehow related to some minimal level of complexity of
life (dualism/free will) or a, actual activity unknown, manifestation of
physical brain activity (determinism). What leads me to believe the
second is more likely is the indirect evidence. Alteration of brain
activity (physical damage, drugs,etc) causes changes in peoples'
reported qualia and changes in (historically expected) personality and
range of choices made. This is usually observable with major changes to
the brain producing major changes in personality and/or range of
choices.but I think it not an unreasonable extrapolation to minor
changes in the brain (caused by minor changes in the environment) to
cause minor changes in experience/choices due to the same mechanisms.

Your friend George is picking new wallpaper for his living room. Knowing
your friend and his living room, you think he will likely pick something
off white with a small floral motif in blue.
You visit and see he chose pale yellow with thin blue striping. You are
not surprised by this and on discussing it with him he states he was
considering something like what you were thinking but this one really
struck him when he saw it in the store.
Or
You visit him and see he chose a vibrant, primary coloured geometric
zig-zag pattern. You think 'was he on drugs? / dropped on his head?' not
'hmm, how unusual'.

So, what is the sourcr of the phenomena we often descibe as 'dualiy'
and/or 'free will? We may never know but my personal belief, based on
the evidence I have, is that it is almost certainly due to some kind of
phyical activity, most likely in the brain (in humans and our close
relatives).
>>
>>> Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
>>> itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
>>> down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
>>> experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
>>> to do so.

--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)

Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
> On 4/28/24 8:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/27/24 1:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>
>> [big snip for focus]
>>
>>>>
>>>> No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
>>>> because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
>>>> practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
>>>> science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
>>>> that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
>>>> study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
>>>> figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
>>>> studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
>>>
>>> As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
>>> effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
>>
>> If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
>> an example or two.
>
> Dualism implies that brain stimulation should not affect mind (it does),
> and an organ through which mind influences brain (never found).
>
>>> Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
>>> has been studied and found wanting.
>>>
>>>> I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
>>>> difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
>>>> door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
>>>> Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
>>>> that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
>>>> everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
>>>> and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
>>>> book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
>>>> considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
>>>> "the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
>>>
>>> Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
>>> familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
>>> read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
>>
>> Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
>> about.
>>
>> The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who
>> started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
>> dispel supernatural ideas.
>>
>>>
>>>> I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
>>>> certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
>>>> Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
>>>> baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
>>>> magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
>>>> language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
>>>> reason. It is heresy."
>>>
>>> How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
>>
>> Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.
>>
>> An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
>> science would be useful.
>>
>>
>>> If anything can
>>> happen, how do you test for "anything"?
>>>
>>>> 'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
>>>
>>> Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
>>> useful as a metaphor.
>>
>> Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
>> driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
>> answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
>> orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful
>> scientists who shared that understanding.
>
> This raises the larger issue of pseudoscience as a whole. It is a
> humungous field, which includes issues that range from wasting people's
> time to killing people outright to starting world wars. Scientists are
> reluctant to most of such issues because (a) they *are* a huge waste of
> time, and (b) responding is often cited by the crackpots as proof that
> they are being taken seriously, so they must be right. If the issues get
> big enough (e.g. homeopathy), then they are worth debunking. But usually
> not before.
>
> Sheldrake was enough of a scientist to know how to make his case
> scientifically. He tried to do so. And his case has been unproductive.
> Some of his studies can't be replicated. Others are vague. If he is
> right, then where are all the telepaths he says exist?
>
Alongside the abandoned Teilhard tangent introducing Sheldrake into the
discussion amounts to Martin JAQing off. He’s incapable of serious follow
up when someone who has a clue calls him on it.

On 29/04/2024 18:53, Bob Casanova wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>
>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>
>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>
>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>
>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>
>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>
>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>
>>> And that one
>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>> itself.
>>
>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>
> Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
> and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
> something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
> reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
> choice, but as for testing it...". It's sometimes amusing to
> discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
> number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
> becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
> even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
> noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
> validity of personal experience.

I think Anil Seth's view of free will in "Being You" is the most cogent
I've seen yet. Basically his proposal is that our sentiment of "free
will" is a cognitive mechanism that evaluates past decisions in order to
make better ones in the future. In this view the whole paradoxes of
"could I have chosen differently in the past" induces with determinism
OR randomness is based on the fact we're really asking "could I have
chosen differently in those conditions" but the conditions are
arbitrarily precise meaning it's hard for the answer to be either "yes"
and seem free, or "no" and seem willful.

But if "free will" isn't so much about "could I have chosen differently
in the past" but "*should* I choose differently *in the future*" that
changes the equation immediately because implicitly it *can't* be about
arbitrarily identical conditions anymore. The exact conditions of the
past will never obtain again, but we will encounter new situations in
the future *that are close enough* for the lessons of the past to be
useful. If so "free will" would really be about our freedom to make
choices within those wider equivalence classes of situations. And the
ability to project ourselves as making any of the possible choices so we
can think them through.

>>
>>> Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
>>> itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
>>> down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
>>> experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
>>> to do so.

On 29/04/2024 18:43, Mark Isaak wrote:
> On 4/26/24 11:57 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, Mark Isaak
>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/26/24 12:27 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>> rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
>>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com
>>>>>>>> (LDagget)
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates
>>>>>>>>>> <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on
>>>>>>>>>>>> Free Will
>>>>>>>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd
>>>>>>>>>>>> like to take
>>>>>>>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any
>>>>>>>>>>>> further
>>>>>>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort
>>>>>>>>>>>> into
>>>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car.
>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also
>>>>>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear
>>>>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined
>>>>>>>>>>>> then what
>>>>>>>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that
>>>>>>>>>>> there was
>>>>>>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different
>>>>>>>>>>> conditions
>>>>>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW
>>>>>>>>>>> that free will
>>>>>>>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the
>>>>>>>>>> assumption
>>>>>>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking
>>>>>>>>>> things a
>>>>>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there
>>>>>>>>>> aren't
>>>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in
>>>>>>>>>> emphasis, it
>>>>>>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time
>>>>>>>>>> pondering
>>>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You missed his point.
>>>>>>>>> Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down
>>>>>>>>> a path.
>>>>>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left
>>>>>>>>> fork or
>>>>>>>>> the right fork?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
>>>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way,
>>>>>>>>> sums up
>>>>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
>>>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
>>>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
>>>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
>>>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
>>>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
>>>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
>>>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to
>>>>>>>>> where
>>>>>>>>> it was better.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
>>>>>>>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
>>>>>>>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
>>>>>>>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
>>>>>>>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
>>>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described
>>>>>>>> above
>>>>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
>>>>>>>> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once
>>>>>>>> all the
>>>>>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
>>>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
>>>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no
>>>>>>>> matter how
>>>>>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
>>>>>>>> reach the same decision.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has
>>>>>>> *not*
>>>>>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price,
>>>>>>> quality,
>>>>>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both
>>>>>>> self and
>>>>>>> one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
>>>>>>> tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in
>>>>>>> six-variable
>>>>>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could
>>>>>>> decide by
>>>>>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
>>>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it
>>>>>>> look in
>>>>>>> various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
>>>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
>>>>>>> kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
>>>>>> underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
>>>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
>>>>>> that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
>>>>>> benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and
>>>>>> benefit
>>>>>> more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
>>>>>> not the trait well survive.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
>>>>>> involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
>>>>>> identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
>>>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
>>>>>
>>>>> I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example,
>>>>> suppose a
>>>>> tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
>>>>> marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
>>>>
>>>> It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
>>>> (free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
>>>> pondering makes no difference.
>>>>
>>>>> As
>>>>> for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
>>>>> decision is predetermined).
>>>>
>>>> I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
>>>> predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
>>>> them.
>>>
>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>
>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>
>>> That is predetermination at work.  Note that it appears, to all
>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>
>> No, that is not at all how determinism works. It does not say that if
>> you move to Tibet you will somehow feel the to buy that house inn the
>> USA. What determinism says is that if you move to Tibet, you will
>> decide to buy a different house but that decision has not been a free
>> will one, it was a result of your conditions changing (moving to
>> Tibet). Your change of country, however, was also not a free will
>> choice, it in turn was the result of other conditions and preceding
>> events:
>>
>> "If determinism is true, then as soon as the Big Bang took place 13
>> billion years ago, the entire history of the universe was already
>> settled. Every event that's ever occurred was already predetermined
>> before it occurred. And this includes human decisions. If determinism
>> is true, then everything you've ever done - every choice you've ever
>> made - was already predetermined before our solar system even existed.
>> And if this is true, then it has obvious implications for free will.
>>
>> Suppose that you're in an ice cream parlor, waiting in line, trying to
>> decide whether to order chocolate or vanilla ice cream. And suppose
>> that when you get to the front of the line, you decide to order
>> chocolate. Was this choice a product of your free will? Well, if
>> determinism is true, then your choice was completely caused by prior
>> events. The immediate causes of the decision were neural events that
>> occurred in your brain just prior to your choice. But, of course, if
>> determinism is true, then those neural events that caused your
>> decision had physical causes as well; they were caused by even earlier
>> events - events that occurred just before they did. And so on,
>> stretching back into the past. We can follow this back to when you
>> were a baby, to the very first events of your life. In fact, we can
>> keep going back before that, because if determinism is true, then
>> those first events were also caused by prior events. We can keep going
>> back to events that occurred before you were even conceived, to events
>> involving your mother and father and a bottle of Chianti.
>>
>> So if determinism is true, then it was already settled before you were
>> born that you were going to order chocolate ice cream when you got to
>> the front of the line. And, of course, the same can be said about all
>> of our decisions, and it seems to follow from this that human beings
>> do not have free will."
>>
>> https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/determinism-classical-argument-against-free-will-failure/
>>
>>
>> That full article is well worth a read, he covers a range of issues
>> including the arguments between determinists like Einstein and
>> indeterminists like Heisenberg and Bohr.
>
> As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ and
> yesterday read his take on free will.  He considers it a modern myth
> disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a
> laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of
> their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do what the
> scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of their
> own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing buttons.
> Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why? Because you
> *chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are
> firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by transplanted
> electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask
> the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! Look,
> I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder -- and
> I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp. 333-334]
>
> References he cites are S.K. Talwar et al., 'Rat navigation guided by
> remote control', Nature 417 (2002); Ben Harder, 'Scientists drive rats
> by remote control', Nat. Geographic 1 May 2012; Tom Clarke, 'Here come
> the ratbots: Desire drives remote-controlled rodents', Nature 2 May
> 2002; D. Graham-Rowe, 'Robo-rat controlled by brain electrodes', New
> Scientist 1 May 2002.  Most or all of those are available online; I did
> not bother copying links, nor have I read them myself.
>
> The book on the whole is well-written, thought-provoking, and
> deliberately provocative; there is stuff in there for everybody to
> disagree with. Or in some cases, maybe, to hate the conclusions even as
> they agree with them.
>

*Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
> Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
>> <me@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
>>>> <me@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> snip
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
>>>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
>>>>>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
>>>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
>>>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
>>>>>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
>>>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
>>>>>>>> perspective.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
>>>>>>> relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
>>>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
>>>>>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
>>>>>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
>>>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
>>>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
>>>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
>>>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
>>>>>>> discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
>>>>>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
>>>>>>> individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
>>>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
>>>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
>>>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
>>>>>
>>>>> Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
>>>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
>>>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
>>>>> Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here:
>>>>> https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
>>>>
>>>> Full critique is available here:
>>>> http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
>>>
>>> Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
>>> let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
>>>>
>>>> I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
>>>> purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
>>>> contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
>>>
>>> I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
>>
>> FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:
>>
>> https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
>>
>> <quote>
>> Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
>> an attack on The Phenomenon of Man — which by this time had become a
>> semi-popular classic — in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
>> anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
>> arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
>> Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
>> He complains of Teilhard's style (“tipsy prose-poetry”), some
>> technical shortcomings (“no grasp of the real weakness of modern
>> evolutionary theory”), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
>> misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
>> standpoint (“obscure pious rant”) and so duping a gullible public
>> (“educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
>> thought”). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
>> Teilhard died in 1954.
>> </quote>
>>
> As I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard. The
> drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle.
> Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are
> the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
> internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
> plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
> ingenuity of antibiotics.
>
> Perhaps forest floor internetworking between trees and mycorrhizae are a
> sorta convergence to the grade of thinking layer. I dunno.
>
> If not for a bolide the non-avian dinosaurs may not have been wiped away
> opening ecological paths or niches for mammals to take. There are so many
> points where evolutionary outcomes could have differed. That we are here
> seems meaningful to us, but not to the universe, even if Teilhard and his
> pal Julian Huxley thought the universe becoming self-aware through us was a
> profound thought. According to Mayr, Huxley thought humans deserved the
> grade (or Kingdom) of Psychozoa which seems somewhat conceited.
>
Just for the fuck of it here’s how I engage in futile efforts on usenet.
Pointless really.

On 29/04/2024 18:46, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 15:12:31 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>
>> On 27/04/2024 10:09, Martin Harran wrote:
>
> I'm snipping a lot of stuff here because I think some of the
> discussion is moving towards endless circles. Also, my time for this
> is a bit limited so I'm cutting to what I think are some of the key
> points.
>
> […]
>
>> I'm a bit confused because you said earlier that "you accept science can
>> only study visible behavior" but now it seems you categorize gravity as
>> non-visible while agreeing it's something science can and does study.
>
> I meant that gravity does have visible 'behaviour' - we can see the
> apple falling from the tree and start to test/quantify different
> things falling from different heights and so on.
>
>
>
> […]
>
>>
>> In terms of why I originally brought this up, I was responding to your
>> statement that "science cannot explain consciousness of which
>> decision-making is a subset". I probably misread the sentence as saying
>> science cannot explain those things *in principle* when you actually
>> just meant that science can't explain them *right now*.
>
> Yes, I meant science can't explain them right *now* but I also
> expressed my opinion that science is focused on a particular approach
> - neurological research - which I don't think will *on its own*
> provide an explanation.

Did you have any comment on my disagreement with that opinion? What has
brought you to think that science is focused on neurological research
for explaining consciousness or decisions?

>
>> Even so I'm
>> surprised at the idea that science currently cannot explain
>> decision-making - but then I'm not sure what level of explanation you
>> were thinking of with that sentence.
>
> Science can explain the neurological process that go on inside the
> brain whilst we are making decisions but cannot explain how we arrive
> at a particular decision.
>

That's funny because I'd have said the exact opposite. Science
absolutely can't currently propose a full explanation for how neurons
interaction yield such a complex behavior as human decision-making, to
my knowledge. That's why there are specific fields studying cognition
that aren't neurology. But what would an explanation of "how we arrive
at a particular decision" look like for you?

>>
>> But all that to say "visible" in this context referred to the fact that
>> if we think of consciousness as causing our visible behavior, then
>> science absolutely could explain it in principle. And I probably
>> misunderstood you when I thought this was something you might disagree with.
>
> As I've said before, neurology has allowed us to get an incredible
> understanding of the 'mechanics' of the brain but also as I've said
> before, I see that like an electronics engineer who has an incredible
> depth of knowledge about the electronic processes going on in my
> computer but that doesn't give him any understanding about the ideas I
> am using that computer to express.
>

In this case the analogy would be more to the software the computer
runs. And I think it's a decent analogy, an electronics engineer
wouldn't necessary know the depths of software engineering in detail and
vice versa. But that's why there are many different kinds of engineers
looking at the different aspects of a computer's function.

> […]
>
>>
>> Science doesn't reject dualism in principle, it rejects it because no
>> dualism hypothesis meets the standards of a scientific hypothesis. "I
>> think we should be able to figure out ways of studying the effects and
>> symptoms that would come from dualism" is exactly correct! Can you give
>> examples of such effects or symptoms?
>
> Okay, to take an area that intrigues me. If our mind is just the
> products of our body, I would expect it to be under the control of
> that body. In practice, however, it is a two-way process- our minds
> can also control our bodies. For example, placebos can "cure" people
> even though they have no medicinal value whatsoever. Or take
> hypnotism; someone can put me into a hypnotic state where I no longer
> feel pain. That hypnosis is induced by an external force which shows
> that control of our mind is not confined to our own bodies.
>
> Just to be clear, I'm not saying these are validation of dualism but
> they are indicators of our minds being capable of being influenced by
> *external* forces.
>
> […]
>

Please note that this isn't an example of an effect or symptom of
dualism, that's an effect or symptom of physicalism that you think is at
odds with observations. I'm still interested in hearing an example for
dualism, because that there are none (that weren't disproven sometime in
the last 200 years at least) is my whole point.

Like, "physicalism has issues" isn't a reason to adopt dualism if
dualism isn't a hypothesis at all. General relativity and quantum
mechanics have notorious issues but they weren't abandoned in favor of
"not general relativity or quantum mechanics", even if the issues might
suggest the latter is correct. Because the latter isn't actually a
coherent idea. The practice is to stick with the actual idea despite its
issues until a better actual idea is found.

As for this as an effect of physicalism I think your expectations are
off. If our mind is a product of our body then it's a complex product,
meaning it's certainly an adaptation, meaning it must have some kind of
selective benefit that accounts for its evolution. The only such benefit
*is* controlling the body - i.e. impacting its behavior in a way that
causes it to outreproduce peers. Controlling the body is literally the
first thing we'd expect a mind to be able to do. It's interesting that
your go-to example was the placebo effect and not "moving our fingers to
type these sentences".

I'm also not sure what the emphasis on "external" is doing. Our minds
are constantly being influenced by the external world via perception -
from a physicalist point of view it's also an obvious evolutionary
feature, flexibly connecting perception to behavior is what brains do.
Hypnosis to all evidence is induced by external forces going through the
mundane perceptual channels you'd expect them to have to go through
under physicalism.

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 14:37:52 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by erik simpson
<eastside.erik@gmail.com>:

>On 4/29/24 1:29 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appeared
>> in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
>> <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
>>
>>> Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>>>
>>>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>>>
>>>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>>>
>>>>> And that one
>>>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>>>> itself.
>>>>
>>>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>>>
>>> Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
>>>
>> Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
>> accurate:
>> "Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
>> the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
>> causally inevitable."
>>
>> To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
>> will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
>> decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.
>>
>> (This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
>> philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
>> have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
>>>
>Re this topic: Did Nando survive the end-google-groups catastrophe? He
>was an expert on the subject of making choices (sometimes impossible ones).
>
Damfino (he resides in my Special Children File), but since
he thought(?) that rocks make decisions I really don't
believe he had much rational to contribute.
>
--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:

>On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>
>>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>>
>>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>>
>>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>>
>>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>>
>>>> And that one
>>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>>> itself.
>>>
>>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>>
>> Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
>> and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
>> something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
>> reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
>> choice, but as for testing it...".
>
>Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
>something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
>overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
>
You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
>
>>It's sometimes amusing to
>> discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
>> number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
>> becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
>> even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
>> noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
>> validity of personal experience.
>
>My, somewhat vague and evolving, view is that it feels like I experience
>'qualia' and 'make choices' between alternatives and that I am not
>special, so others who report the same are not philosophical zombies
>deterministically lying to me. It is a 'real thing'. I see two
>possibilities. There is some unknown, evidenced phenomenon unrelated to
>known physics somehow related to some minimal level of complexity of
>life (dualism/free will) or a, actual activity unknown, manifestation of
>physical brain activity (determinism). What leads me to believe the
>second is more likely is the indirect evidence. Alteration of brain
>activity (physical damage, drugs,etc) causes changes in peoples'
>reported qualia and changes in (historically expected) personality and
>range of choices made. This is usually observable with major changes to
>the brain producing major changes in personality and/or range of
>choices.but I think it not an unreasonable extrapolation to minor
>changes in the brain (caused by minor changes in the environment) to
>cause minor changes in experience/choices due to the same mechanisms.
>
>Your friend George is picking new wallpaper for his living room. Knowing
>your friend and his living room, you think he will likely pick something
>off white with a small floral motif in blue.
>You visit and see he chose pale yellow with thin blue striping. You are
>not surprised by this and on discussing it with him he states he was
>considering something like what you were thinking but this one really
>struck him when he saw it in the store.
>Or
>You visit him and see he chose a vibrant, primary coloured geometric
>zig-zag pattern. You think 'was he on drugs? / dropped on his head?' not
>'hmm, how unusual'.
>
>So, what is the sourcr of the phenomena we often descibe as 'dualiy'
>and/or 'free will? We may never know but my personal belief, based on
>the evidence I have, is that it is almost certainly due to some kind of
>phyical activity, most likely in the brain (in humans and our close
>relatives).
>>>
>>>> Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
>>>> itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
>>>> down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
>>>> experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
>>>> to do so.
>
>--
--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 13:29:50 -0700, Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off>
wrote:

>On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appeared
>in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
><ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
>
>>Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>> On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>
>>>>> On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
>>>>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
>>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
>>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
>>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
>>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
>>>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
>>>>>> although its implications are?
>>>>>
>>>>> No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
>>>>>
>>>> OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
>>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
>>>
>>> My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
>>>
>>>> And that one
>>>> possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
>>>> itself.
>>>
>>> I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
>>>
>>Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
>>
>Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
>accurate:
>"Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
>the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
>causally inevitable."
>
>To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
>will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
>decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.

I think they are only incompatible if one argues exclusively for one
or the other. As I remarked earlier in this discussion, it reminds me
a bit of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also
applies here.

I have to go out later on today. I will wear long trousers and a
raincoat rather than shorts and a t-shirt. Whilst that is arguably a
free will choice, I don't even have to think about it - the fact that
it is cold and raining has effectively made the decision for me.

On the other hand, let's imagine I am still working and have been
offered a super promotion, a job I would love to do and a substantial
increase in salary. It means, however, a move to a different city,
disrupting family life and my children's education. There is no
obvious correct answer there, it will involve consideration of a whole
range of factors so I will need to take time for reflection and
discussion with my family before I make a decision. There are some
deterministic factors there - I wouldn't have to make the decision if
I hadn't been offered the promotion, the views of my family will have
an influence on my decision - but I don't believe my final decision is
determined in advance by those factors.

>
>(This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
>philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
>have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
>>

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 22:59:34 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:

>*Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
>> Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
>>> <me@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
>>>>> <me@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> snip
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
>>>>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
>>>>>>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
>>>>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
>>>>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
>>>>>>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
>>>>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
>>>>>>>>> perspective.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
>>>>>>>> relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
>>>>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
>>>>>>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
>>>>>>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
>>>>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
>>>>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
>>>>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
>>>>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
>>>>>>>> discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
>>>>>>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
>>>>>>>> individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
>>>>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
>>>>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
>>>>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
>>>>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
>>>>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
>>>>>> Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here:
>>>>>> https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
>>>>>
>>>>> Full critique is available here:
>>>>> http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
>>>>
>>>> Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
>>>> let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
>>>>>
>>>>> I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
>>>>> purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
>>>>> contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
>>>>
>>>> I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
>>>
>>> FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:
>>>
>>> https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
>>>
>>> <quote>
>>> Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
>>> an attack on The Phenomenon of Man ? which by this time had become a
>>> semi-popular classic ? in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
>>> anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
>>> arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
>>> Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
>>> He complains of Teilhard's style (?tipsy prose-poetry?), some
>>> technical shortcomings (?no grasp of the real weakness of modern
>>> evolutionary theory?), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
>>> misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
>>> standpoint (?obscure pious rant?) and so duping a gullible public
>>> (?educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
>>> thought?). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
>>> Teilhard died in 1954.
>>> </quote>
>>>
>> As I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard. The
>> drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle.
>> Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are
>> the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
>> internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
>> plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
>> ingenuity of antibiotics.
>>
>> Perhaps forest floor internetworking between trees and mycorrhizae are a
>> sorta convergence to the grade of thinking layer. I dunno.
>>
>> If not for a bolide the non-avian dinosaurs may not have been wiped away
>> opening ecological paths or niches for mammals to take. There are so many
>> points where evolutionary outcomes could have differed. That we are here
>> seems meaningful to us, but not to the universe, even if Teilhard and his
>> pal Julian Huxley thought the universe becoming self-aware through us was a
>> profound thought. According to Mayr, Huxley thought humans deserved the
>> grade (or Kingdom) of Psychozoa which seems somewhat conceited.
>>
>Just for the fuck of it here’s how I engage in futile efforts on usenet.
>Pointless really.

Self-inflicted in this case at least. I actually had a couple of
replies almost ready to post about this and some of your other points
but I have now discarded them due entirely to your boorish behaviour.

On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 22:45:32 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:

>Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>> On 4/28/24 8:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
>>> <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 4/27/24 1:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>
>>> [big snip for focus]
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
>>>>> because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
>>>>> practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
>>>>> science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
>>>>> that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
>>>>> study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
>>>>> figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
>>>>> studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
>>>>
>>>> As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
>>>> effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
>>>
>>> If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
>>> an example or two.
>>
>> Dualism implies that brain stimulation should not affect mind (it does),
>> and an organ through which mind influences brain (never found).
>>
>>>> Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
>>>> has been studied and found wanting.
>>>>
>>>>> I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
>>>>> difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
>>>>> door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
>>>>> Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
>>>>> that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
>>>>> everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
>>>>> and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
>>>>> book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
>>>>> considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
>>>>> "the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
>>>>
>>>> Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
>>>> familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
>>>> read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
>>>
>>> Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
>>> about.
>>>
>>> The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who
>>> started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
>>> dispel supernatural ideas.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
>>>>> certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
>>>>> Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
>>>>> baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
>>>>> magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
>>>>> language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
>>>>> reason. It is heresy."
>>>>
>>>> How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
>>>
>>> Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.
>>>
>>> An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
>>> science would be useful.
>>>
>>>
>>>> If anything can
>>>> happen, how do you test for "anything"?
>>>>
>>>>> 'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
>>>>
>>>> Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
>>>> useful as a metaphor.
>>>
>>> Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
>>> driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
>>> answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
>>> orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful
>>> scientists who shared that understanding.
>>
>> This raises the larger issue of pseudoscience as a whole. It is a
>> humungous field, which includes issues that range from wasting people's
>> time to killing people outright to starting world wars. Scientists are
>> reluctant to most of such issues because (a) they *are* a huge waste of
>> time, and (b) responding is often cited by the crackpots as proof that
>> they are being taken seriously, so they must be right. If the issues get
>> big enough (e.g. homeopathy), then they are worth debunking. But usually
>> not before.
>>
>> Sheldrake was enough of a scientist to know how to make his case
>> scientifically. He tried to do so. And his case has been unproductive.
>> Some of his studies can't be replicated. Others are vague. If he is
>> right, then where are all the telepaths he says exist?
>>
>Alongside the abandoned Teilhard tangent introducing Sheldrake into the
>discussion amounts to Martin JAQing off. He’s incapable of serious follow
>up when someone who has a clue calls him on it.

WOW, the fact that I choose not to engage with *you* on issues means I
don't have answers on those issues. The TO version of "The king is
dead, long live the king!" is "Peter is dead, long live
Hemidactylus!!"