There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.

One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?

Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?

A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?

On 05/04/2024 18:05, Martin Harran wrote:
> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>
> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>
> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
> that we will change it?
>
> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>

I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.

In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.

On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>
> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?

Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>
> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
> that we will change it?

Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>
> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.

--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)

On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>
>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>
>Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>exists. You are 'begging the question'.

It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.

>>
>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>> that we will change it?
>
>Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?

We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.

>>
>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>
>I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
>way or the other.
>

I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
>--

On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:37 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:

>On 05/04/2024 18:05, Martin Harran wrote:
>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>
>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>
>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>> that we will change it?
>>
>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>
>
>I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
>context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
>about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
>they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
>*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
>brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
>only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
>cycles the experiments were seeing.

I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
alertness.
>
>In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
>actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
>"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
>you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
>but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
>at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
>to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
>the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
>have at the beginning of the process.

Martin Harran wrote:

> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
> wrote:

>>On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>
>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>
>>Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>exists. You are 'begging the question'.

> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
> those options when they don't even exist.

You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?

The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.

The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.

Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.

Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)

To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.

The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.

An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.

On 06/04/2024 10:18, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:37 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>
>> On 05/04/2024 18:05, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>
>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>
>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>> that we will change it?
>>>
>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>
>>
>> I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
>> context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
>> about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
>> they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
>> *the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
>> brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
>> only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
>> cycles the experiments were seeing.
>
> I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
> related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
> conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
> I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
> into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
> without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
> significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
> with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
> similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
> autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
> alertness.

My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
(mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
(which is how I usually use the expression).

If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).

The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
much focused on the action being studied.

>>
>> In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
>> actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
>> "sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
>> you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
>> but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
>> at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
>> to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
>> the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
>> have at the beginning of the process.
>

On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>
>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>
>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>
> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
> deliberating over the various options.

See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.

You seem to be taking things a
> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
> those options when they don't even exist.

It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
>
>>>
>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>> that we will change it?
>>
>> Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>
> We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
>
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
>>>
>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>
>> I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
>> way or the other.
>>
>
> I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
> in favour of determinism.
>> --
>

--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)

On 2024-04-06 5:22 AM, LDagget wrote:
> Martin Harran wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>
>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>
>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>
>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>
>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>> those options when they don't even exist.
>
> You missed his point. Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot
> walking down a path.
> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
> the right fork?
> The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
> The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
> Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
> it was better.
>
> Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants. Map it
> into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
> me if I have abused his intent too far)

It's not the way I would have made the argument, but it covers my point
pretty well

I would like to make the point that my view of determinism does not lead
to a fixed future except in the very short term. I think it is fairly
clear that random, probabilistic variability is part of our universe and
this makes prediction of just which deterministic future we end up in
impossible. But Random variation stuck on top of determinism doesn't
offer much comfort to the 'little invisible, supernatural man in my head
pushing my brain around' crowd.
>
> To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
> The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
>
> An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
> All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
> that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
> before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions to the
> subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
> to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
>

--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)

On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:

>Martin Harran wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>
>>>On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>
>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>
>>>Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>
>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>> those options when they don't even exist.
>
>You missed his point.
>Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
>The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
>the right fork?
>
>The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
>
>The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
>process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
>some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
>tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
>
>Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
>and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
>is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
>the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
>one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
>robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
>can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
>its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
>it was better.
>
>Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
>Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
>right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
>didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
>me if I have abused his intent too far)
>
>To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
>it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.

It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.

>
>The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.

In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.

>
>An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
>All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
>that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
>before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
>to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
>to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.

On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>
>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>
>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>
>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>> deliberating over the various options.
>
>See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>
> You seem to be taking things a
>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>> those options when they don't even exist.
>
>It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.

That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?

In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.

>>
>>>>
>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>> that we will change it?
>>>
>>> Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>>
>> We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
>>
>Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
>Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
>continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
>lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
>colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
>her mind?

I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week. My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?

>>>>
>>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>>
>>> I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
>>> way or the other.
>>>
>>
>> I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
>> in favour of determinism.
>>> --
>>
>
>--

On 2024-04-07 10:25 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>
>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>
>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>
>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>> deliberating over the various options.
>>
>> See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>> what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>> circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>>
>> You seem to be taking things a
>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>
>> It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
>
> That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
> predetermined?

Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'? Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
>
> In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
> pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
> consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
> can often distract us from other important things we should be using
> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
> predetermined process.

How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
>
>
>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>>> that we will change it?
>>>>
>>>> Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>>>
>>> We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
>>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
>>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
>>>
>> Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
>> Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
>> continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
>> lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
>> colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
>> her mind?
>
> I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
> because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
> decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
> with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
> papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
> similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
> to start papering later in the week.

You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)

My wife passed no further remark
> on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
> think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
> said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."

So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.

> Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
> entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
> sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
> process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
> mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
> on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?

THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
>
>>>>>
>>>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>>>
>>>> I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
>>>> way or the other.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
>>> in favour of determinism.
>>>> --
>>>
>>
>> --
>

--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)

On 2024-04-07 10:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
> wrote:
>
>> Martin Harran wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>
>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>
>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>
>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>
>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>
>> You missed his point.
>> Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
>> the right fork?
>>
>> The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
>>
>> The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
>>
>> Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
>> it was better.
>>
>> Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
>>
>> To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
>
> It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
> available or likely to be available *has been processed*.

How do you know that that actually happens? In the 'free will' situation
why does a delay happen? And how does any explanation you give
distinguish from a deterministic situation?

Once all the
> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function;

Dagget's robot description makes the "just hang about for a while"
function eminently pointed.

no matter how
> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
> reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
> random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
> determinism.

As I understand it, the 'hidden variables' idea in physics is pretty
much defunct, so there is some randomness built in to the universe. T
his effects my idea of determinism to make it only predictable
probablistically. Highly accurate in the short term but poor in the long
term. How does the 'free will' idea handle it (randomness)?
>
>>
>> The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
>
> In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
> example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
> ignored.
>
>>
>> An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
>> All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
>> that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
>> before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
>> to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
>> to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
>

--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)

On 07/04/2024 17:01, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
> wrote:
>
>> Martin Harran wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>
>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>
>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>
>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>
>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>
>> You missed his point.
>> Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
>> the right fork?
>>
>> The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
>>
>> The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
>>
>> Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
>> it was better.
>>
>> Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
>>
>> To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
>
> It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
> reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
> random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
> determinism.

I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).

Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.

It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.

Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.

The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.

If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time. And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).

>
>>
>> The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
>
> In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
> example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
> ignored.
>
>>
>> An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
>> All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
>> that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
>> before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
>> to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
>> to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
>

Martin Harran wrote:

> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
> wrote:

>>On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>
>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>
>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>
>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>> deliberating over the various options.
>>
>>See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>>what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>>circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>>there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>>
>> You seem to be taking things a
>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>
>>It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.

> That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
> predetermined?

> In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
> pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
> consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
> can often distract us from other important things we should be using
> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
> predetermined process.

"And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"

sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
and there you'd have part of the answer.

The main problem with your analysis is that
it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
compromises. An influential recent book has been
Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.

The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
all the relevant information, and identify all
they implications. So "taking time off" works
often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
to be an advantage, and prevent us from
premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
it can of course be positively harmful and require
professional intervention.

>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>>> that we will change it?
>>>>
>>>> Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>>>
>>> We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
>>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
>>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
>>>
>>Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
>>Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
>>continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
>>lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
>>colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
>>her mind?

> I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
> because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
> decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
> with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
> papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
> similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
> to start papering later in the week. My wife passed no further remark
> on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
> think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
> said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
> Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
> entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
> sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
> process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
> mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
> on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?

>>>>>
>>>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>>>
>>>> I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
>>>> way or the other.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
>>> in favour of determinism.
>>>> --
>>>
>>
>>--

Burkhard <b.schafer@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> Martin Harran wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>
>>> On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>
>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>> deliberating over the various options.
>>>
>>> See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>>> what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>>> circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>>>
>>> You seem to be taking things a
>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>
>>> It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
>
>> That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
>> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
>> predetermined?
>
>> In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
>> pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
>> consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
>> can often distract us from other important things we should be using
>> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
>> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
>> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
>> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
>> predetermined process.
>
> "And thus the native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
>
> sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
> wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
> case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
> and there you'd have part of the answer.
>
> The main problem with your analysis is that
> it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
> that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
> compromises. An influential recent book has been
> Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
> between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
> instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
> more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
> AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
>
> The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
> to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
> be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
> all the relevant information, and identify all
> they implications. So "taking time off" works
> often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
> to be an advantage, and prevent us from
> premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
> wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
> it can of course be positively harmful and require
> professional intervention.
>
Is rumination (overthinking) the curse of System 2 deliberation? Maybe it
cannot be helped so either it’s not free will or instead free will as a
catastrophizing train wreck?

Paralysis by analysis is also detrimental, but so is System 1 impulsiveness
or shooting from the hip in some instances.

What is it called when System 2 deliberation is applied so many times that
the result in a given circumstance becomes habit or second nature? Does it
become the intuitive backgrounding of System 1?

*Hemidactylus* wrote:

> Burkhard <b.schafer@ed.ac.uk> wrote:

> What is it called when System 2 deliberation is applied so many times that
> the result in a given circumstance becomes habit or second nature? Does it
> become the intuitive backgrounding of System 1?

speed chess

On 08/04/2024 19:32, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
> Burkhard <b.schafer@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>> Martin Harran wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>
>>>> On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>>
>>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>>> deliberating over the various options.
>>>>
>>>> See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>>>> what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>>>> circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>>>>
>>>> You seem to be taking things a
>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>>
>>>> It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
>>
>>> That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
>>> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
>>> predetermined?
>>
>>> In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
>>> pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
>>> consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
>>> can often distract us from other important things we should be using
>>> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
>>> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
>>> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
>>> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
>>> predetermined process.
>>
>> "And thus the native hue of resolution
>> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
>>
>> sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
>> wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
>> case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
>> and there you'd have part of the answer.
>>
>> The main problem with your analysis is that
>> it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
>> that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
>> compromises. An influential recent book has been
>> Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
>> between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
>> instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
>> more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
>> AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
>>
>> The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
>> to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
>> be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
>> all the relevant information, and identify all
>> they implications. So "taking time off" works
>> often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
>> to be an advantage, and prevent us from
>> premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
>> wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
>> it can of course be positively harmful and require
>> professional intervention.
>>
> Is rumination (overthinking) the curse of System 2 deliberation? Maybe it
> cannot be helped so either it’s not free will or instead free will as a
> catastrophizing train wreck?
>
> Paralysis by analysis is also detrimental, but so is System 1 impulsiveness
> or shooting from the hip in some instances.
>
> What is it called when System 2 deliberation is applied so many times that
> the result in a given circumstance becomes habit or second nature? Does it
> become the intuitive backgrounding of System 1?
>

I don't know the answer but that's my guess too. I bet the way this
works is that System 2 is able to feed data into System 1 that it can
learn from the same way it learns from experience. Except with a huge
discount because System 1 is mostly a black box from a "changing how it
works" perspective, and it probably wouldn't be adaptive to do too much
of that anyway (System 2 is good but not *that* good).

That actually reminds me of Anil Seth's ideas on free will in "Being
You" which probably works out to exactly this. Basically his take is
that "free will" isn't about the past but about the future. It's asking
"could I have done differently" not from a determinism perspective but
to answer "could/should I do differently next time & how". If we assume
decisions are mostly System 1, for this to work requires System 2 to be
able to influence System 1's intuitive backgrounding.

On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 12:14:12 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>On 2024-04-07 10:25 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>
>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>> deliberating over the various options.
>>>
>>> See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>>> what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>>> circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>>>
>>> You seem to be taking things a
>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>
>>> It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
>>
>> That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
>> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
>> predetermined?
>
>Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?

I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?

>Pre 'pondering' it is
>just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
>conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
>result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
>the 'pondering' among other changes.
>>
>> In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
>> pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
>> consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
>> can often distract us from other important things we should be using
>> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
>> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
>> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
>> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
>> predetermined process.
>
>How does 'free will' avoid this problem?

First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]

Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.

FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.

>>
>>
>>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>>>> that we will change it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>>>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>>>>
>>>> We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
>>>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
>>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
>>>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
>>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
>>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
>>>>
>>> Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
>>> Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
>>> continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
>>> lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
>>> colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
>>> her mind?
>>
>> I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
>> because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
>> decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
>> with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
>> papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
>> similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
>> to start papering later in the week.
>
>You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
>with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
>standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
>(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
>resist the opportunity)

LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(

>
> My wife passed no further remark
>> on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
>> think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
>> said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
>
>So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
>deterministic action.

On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 20:51:09 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:

>On 06/04/2024 10:18, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:37 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>>
>>> On 05/04/2024 18:05, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>
>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>
>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>> that we will change it?
>>>>
>>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
>>> context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
>>> about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
>>> they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
>>> *the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
>>> brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
>>> only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
>>> cycles the experiments were seeing.
>>
>> I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
>> related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
>> conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
>> I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
>> into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
>> without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
>> significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
>> with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
>> similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
>> autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
>> alertness.
>
>
>My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
>I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
>book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
>on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
>decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
>(mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
>machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
>know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
>or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
>(which is how I usually use the expression).
>
>
>If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
>phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
>being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
>other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
>decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
>them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
>be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).
>
>
>The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
>far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
>much focused on the action being studied.

I'm not all that familiar with the details of the Libet experiments
but as I understand it, the experiment basically involved participants
watching a clock and making random decisions to press a button. I
can't speak for the participants but I know that I would find it very
difficult to remain totally focused in what seems like a potentially
boring situation, my ever-active mind would start wandering all over
the place and every so often, the "little man at the back of my head"
would remind me that I'm supposed to be focusing on the clock. That
"little man at the back of my head" could be what was triggering the
detected activity.

Just to be clear, I'm not literally suggesting "a little man at the
back of my head", but there does seem to be some sort of monitoring
element in our minds that switches us from autopilot to full alertness
as in the example I gave of spotting the playing children when
driving.

>
>
>>>
>>> In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
>>> actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
>>> "sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
>>> you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
>>> but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
>>> at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
>>> to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
>>> the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
>>> have at the beginning of the process.
>>

On Mon, 8 Apr 2024 13:26:46 +0000, b.schafer@ed.ac.uk (Burkhard)
wrote:

>Martin Harran wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>
>>>On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>
>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>> deliberating over the various options.
>>>
>>>See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>>>what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>>>circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>>>there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>>>
>>> You seem to be taking things a
>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>
>>>It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
>
>> That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
>> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
>> predetermined?
>
>> In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
>> pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
>> consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
>> can often distract us from other important things we should be using
>> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
>> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
>> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
>> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
>> predetermined process.
>
>"And thus the native hue of resolution
>Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
>
>sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
>wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
>case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
>and there you'd have part of the answer.
>
>The main problem with your analysis is that
>it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free.

No, you've completely misunderstood what I said - see my latest reply
to Don where I expanded on my thinking about Cost vs Benefits.

>But
>that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
>compromises. An influential recent book has been
>Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman.

That's a book I've never got around to reading but I really should do
so.

>He differentiates
> between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
>instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
>more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
>AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
>
>The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
>to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
>be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
>all the relevant information, and identify all
>they implications. So "taking time off" works
>often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
>to be an advantage, and prevent us from
>premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
>wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
>it can of course be positively harmful and require
>professional intervention.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>>>> that we will change it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>>>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>>>>
>>>> We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
>>>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
>>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
>>>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
>>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
>>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
>>>>
>>>Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
>>>Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
>>>continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
>>>lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
>>>colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
>>>her mind?
>
>> I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
>> because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
>> decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
>> with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
>> papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
>> similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
>> to start papering later in the week. My wife passed no further remark
>> on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
>> think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
>> said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
>> Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
>> entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
>> sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
>> process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
>> mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
>> on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>>>>
>>>>> I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
>>>>> way or the other.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
>>>> in favour of determinism.
>>>>> --
>>>>
>>>
>>>--

On 09/04/2024 10:52, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 20:51:09 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>
>> On 06/04/2024 10:18, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:37 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 05/04/2024 18:05, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>
>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>>> that we will change it?
>>>>>
>>>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
>>>> context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
>>>> about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
>>>> they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
>>>> *the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
>>>> brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
>>>> only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
>>>> cycles the experiments were seeing.
>>>
>>> I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
>>> related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
>>> conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
>>> I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
>>> into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
>>> without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
>>> significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
>>> with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
>>> similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
>>> autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
>>> alertness.
>>
>>
>> My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
>> I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
>> book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
>> on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
>> decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
>> (mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
>> machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
>> know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
>> or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
>> (which is how I usually use the expression).
>>
>>
>> If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
>> phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
>> being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
>> other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
>> decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
>> them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
>> be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).
>>
>>
>> The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
>> far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
>> much focused on the action being studied.
>
> I'm not all that familiar with the details of the Libet experiments
> but as I understand it, the experiment basically involved participants
> watching a clock and making random decisions to press a button. I
> can't speak for the participants but I know that I would find it very
> difficult to remain totally focused in what seems like a potentially
> boring situation, my ever-active mind would start wandering all over
> the place and every so often, the "little man at the back of my head"
> would remind me that I'm supposed to be focusing on the clock. That
> "little man at the back of my head" could be what was triggering the
> detected activity.
>
> Just to be clear, I'm not literally suggesting "a little man at the
> back of my head", but there does seem to be some sort of monitoring
> element in our minds that switches us from autopilot to full alertness
> as in the example I gave of spotting the playing children when
> driving.
>

Right, and in that example the actual decision to press the button would
be made in the alert state - "by the little man at the back of my head".
Whereas when driving "on autopilot" all the driving decisions are NOT
being made by the little man. An event that triggers his activation,
like seeing the playing children, takes you out of autopilot mode at the
same time.

>
>>
>>
>>>>
>>>> In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
>>>> actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
>>>> "sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
>>>> you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
>>>> but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
>>>> at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
>>>> to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
>>>> the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
>>>> have at the beginning of the process.
>>>
>

On Mon, 8 Apr 2024 10:19:01 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:

>On 07/04/2024 17:01, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Martin Harran wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>
>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>
>>> You missed his point.
>>> Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
>>> the right fork?
>>>
>>> The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
>>>
>>> The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
>>>
>>> Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
>>> it was better.
>>>
>>> Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
>>>
>>> To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
>>
>> It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
>> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
>> reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
>> random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
>> determinism.
>
>
>I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
>processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
>about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
>
>Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
>decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
>doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
>very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
>made the choice.
>
>It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
>the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
>component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
>something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
>flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
>but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
>
>Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
>between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
>consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
>as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
>Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
>or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
>"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
>slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
>effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
>
>
>The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
>"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
>answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
>is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
>the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
>actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
>different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
>"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
>involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
>between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
>the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
>scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
>coherent preference.
>
>
>If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
>all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
>processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
>curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
>information is being processed the whole time.

What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.

Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?

>And in fact could keep
>being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
>required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
>name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
>option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
>Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
>your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
>
>
>>
>>>
>>> The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
>>
>> In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
>> example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
>> ignored.
>>
>>>
>>> An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
>>> All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
>>> that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
>>> before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
>>> to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
>>> to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
>>

On 09/04/2024 11:09, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Apr 2024 10:19:01 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
>
>> On 07/04/2024 17:01, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>
>>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>>
>>>> You missed his point.
>>>> Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
>>>> the right fork?
>>>>
>>>> The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
>>>>
>>>> The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
>>>>
>>>> Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
>>>> it was better.
>>>>
>>>> Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
>>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
>>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
>>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
>>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
>>>>
>>>> To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
>>>
>>> It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
>>> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
>>> reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
>>> random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
>>> determinism.
>>
>>
>> I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
>> processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
>> about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
>>
>> Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
>> decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
>> doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
>> very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
>> made the choice.
>>
>> It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
>> the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
>> component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
>> something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
>> flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
>> but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
>>
>> Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
>> between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
>> consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
>> as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
>> Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
>> or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
>> "feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
>> slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
>> effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
>>
>>
>> The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
>> "thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
>> answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
>> is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
>> the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
>> actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
>> different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
>> "information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
>> involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
>> between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
>> the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
>> scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
>> coherent preference.
>>
>>
>> If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
>> all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
>> processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
>> curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
>> information is being processed the whole time.
>
> What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
> one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
> seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
> and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
> focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
> experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
> now.
>
> Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
> - where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
> just to process information where the decision has been
> pre-determined?
>

On 2024-04-09 3:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 12:14:12 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On 2024-04-07 10:25 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>> On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>>>>>>> There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
>>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
>>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
>>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
>>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
>>>>>
>>>>> It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
>>>>> deliberating over the various options.
>>>>
>>>> See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
>>>> what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
>>>> circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
>>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
>>>>
>>>> You seem to be taking things a
>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
>>>>
>>>> It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
>>>
>>> That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
>>> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
>>> predetermined?
>>
>> Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
>
> I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
> is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
> Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
> cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
> outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
> cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
> chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
> considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
> resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
> by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
> the cost?
>
>> Pre 'pondering' it is
>> just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
>> conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
>> result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
>> the 'pondering' among other changes.
>>>
>>> In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
>>> pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
>>> consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
>>> can often distract us from other important things we should be using
>>> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
>>> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
>>> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
>>> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
>>> predetermined process.
>>
>> How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
>
> First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
> not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
> the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
> to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
> by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
> previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
>
> Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
> can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
> making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
> those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
> to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
> and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
>
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in
a deterministic scenario?

> FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
> of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
> here.
>
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
>>>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
>>>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
>>>>>>> that we will change it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
>>>>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
>>>>>
>>>>> We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
>>>>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
>>>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
>>>>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
>>>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
>>>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
>>>>>
>>>> Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
>>>> Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
>>>> continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
>>>> lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
>>>> colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
>>>> her mind?
>>>
>>> I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
>>> because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
>>> decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
>>> with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
>>> papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
>>> similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
>>> to start papering later in the week.
>>
>> You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
>> with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
>> standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
>> (I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
>> resist the opportunity)
>
> LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
> one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
> about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
> it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
> year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
> to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
>
>>
>> My wife passed no further remark
>>> on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
>>> think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
>>> said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
>>
>> So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
>> deterministic action.
>
> At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
> it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
> any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
>
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
considered, logical decision. /s
>>
>>> Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
>>> entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
>>> sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
>>> process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
>>> mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
>>> on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
>>
>> THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
>> conditions *at the time*.
>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
>>>>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
>>>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
>>>>>> way or the other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
>>>>> in favour of determinism.
>>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>
>>
>> --
>
>
> [1]
> https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
>